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Giving Intellectual Property 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen' & Jeffrey A. Maine.. 
The interdisciplinarity of intellectual property and taxation poses many 
challenges to the disparate existing norms in each respective field of law. ~This 
Article identifies and critiques the current tax regime governing the giving of 
intellectual property as a manifestation of the failure to understand the 
principles and policies underlying intellectual property and the firm. It 
proposes an economic, incentives-based system that would encourage firms to 
extricate part of their repository of residual rights by surrendering their 
monopolistic ownership of intellectual property for the benefit of charitable 
organizations and, in turn, the development and growth ofsociety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars of modem theories of the firm regard the firm as the 
repository of residual property rights,1 specifically, intangible intellectual 
property rights.2 Under property-based .theories of the firm, intellectual 
property rights allocate and maximize the firm's own resources in 
· addition to serving interfirm functions in the market.3 Thus, as the 
economy becomes increasingly dependent on information and 
technology, the proprietary rights of intellectual property are important 
to the firm and its existence.4 For example, a firm's repository of 
intellectual property rights often functions as a signal of the firm's 
financial prospects, among other things.5 Consequently, the firm has a 
strong desire to control its repository for optimal return.6 With this in 
mind, under what regime would the firm relinquish part of its repository 
for the benefit of social good? 
Imagine that you are the CEO of a firm that holds a very large patent 
portfolio. Like many of your competitors, your firm possesses more 
patents than it needs for its monopolistic present and future pipe drugs 
and has no desire to devote part of its budget to pay for the maintenance 
1 See David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
241, 263-65 (applying property-based theories of firm in evaluating open source software 
licensing, and arguing that decentralized open source community functions like firm); D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory ofFiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1444-47 
(2002) (analyzing property-based theories of firm and its fiduciary duties). 
2 See Dan Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. On. L. REv. 3, 3-7 (2004) 
(examining relationship between intellectual property and firm). 
3 Id. at 8 ("Property-based theories of firm suggest that the right to access and use 
dedicated resources must be allocated within the firm as well as beyond the firm, This 
means that, in addition to their recognized inter-firm functions, proprietary rights may also 
serve to coordinate resources within a firm."); see, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and 
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STIJD. 683, 709 (1980); see also Edmund 
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) 
(suggesting that under property-based theories of firm, assignment of patents vests firm 
with control of intangible assets for optimal results because firm can best coordinate, 
allocate, and promote resources). 
4 See Burk, supra note 2, at 8-20 (analyzing different intellectual property doctrines 
through lenses of property-based theories of firm for better understanding of intellectual 
. property law). 
5 See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals,. 69 U. On. L. REv. 625 (2002) (analyzing 
patent rights as "signaling mechanism[s]" that convey information about firm, including its 
financial prospects). 
· 
6 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Boundaries of the Firm 2 (N.Y. Univ., 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18, 2005), available at http:/ /lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=nyu/lewp (stating that intellectual property law iS 
"important factor influencing the boundary between the firm and the market"). 
·l 
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· of unused patents. Given the negative spotlights on numerous corporate 
scandals in the media, your firm wants to donate a number of patents to 
educational and research institutions to enhance its corporate image and 
to further these institutions' basic fundamental and purely scientific 
investigation. However, the firm also wants to receive tax incentives for 
such giving. You have heard from one of your peers that your firm may 
not be able to enjoy a current tax deduction for its intellectual property 
donations, but may be entitled to future tax deductions if the charitable 
doriee get:J.erates income from the intellectual property. 
Why should a firm freely relinquish its monopoly on its patents, and 
forego the positive signals such patents send, if there are no. immediate 
financial incentives to do so, but only speculative future tax benefits? 
Why does the law burden the intellectual property holder to identify . 
commercially-driven institutions as potential donees if it has any hope of 
realizing some kind of financial tax benefit in the future? Why is the 
donation of intellectual property treated vastly differently from the 
donation of real. estate to a local university or of old furniture to the 
Salvation Army? Even though the firm may now decide to not use 
certain patents, the research arid development resources spent on those 
patents have been enormous. Hence, the common reaction from firms is 
understandable: absent immediate economic incentives, no donations 
will be made. 
The interdisciplinarity of intellectual property and taxation poses 
many challenges to the disparate existing norms in each respective field 
of law. The hypothetical above demonstrates the failure to understand 
the principles and policies underlying intellectual property. Federal 
intellectual property laws and federal tax laws should work together to 
benefit society as a whole by facilitating the progress of science and the 
creation .of useful arts. U.S. patent and copyright laws provide patent ­
holders .and authors of copyrights monopolistic rights ":'is-a-vis the 
significant legal protections for patents and copyrights for a limited 
time.7 Federal tax laws allow mosttaxpayers to immediately recover the 
costs of their inventions and creations, despite the fact that these 
properties have long protectible lives under patent and copyright law.8 
' The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the progress of science and 
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, d. 8. The United States has a legal 
system of strong intellectual property rights. For a discussion of U.S. patent protections, 
see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of U.S. copyright protections, 
see infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
For example, section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") permits a taxpayer 
to inunediately deduct research or experimental expenditures.· I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006}. 
8 
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While both intellectual property and tax laws promote socially 
desirable inventive and creative activities, additional tax incentives are 
needed to encourage the dissemination of technologies and useful arts to 
the public for the maximum social good. To achieve the policy goals of 
ultimate innovation and creation, the government should provide 
incentives to encourage patentees to donate, rather than abandon, their 
"orphan" patents to universities, hospitals, and other nonprofit 
organizations with research and development facilities that can properly 
exploit the patents. Similarly, incentives should be in place to encourage 
authors and artists to donate their copyrights and literary manuscripts 
and works of art to public libraries, museums, and other cultural 
institutionS, rather than sell their works to private collections in the 
United States and overseas. 
This.Article advocates for the implementation of systematic incentives 
that would encourage donors to surrender their monopolistic ownership 
of intellectual property for the benefit of charitable organizations and, in 
tum, the development and growth of society. Part I . of this Article 
explores the trend of charitable giving and the impact of technology on 
postmodern philanthropy. Part II discusses the importance of. 
intellectual property in the global, knowledge-based economy and 
demonstrates the benefit of outright ownership of intellectual property 
by charitable donees. Although this Article recognizes that the present 
tax system requires intellectual property donors to make complete 
assignments to charities to obtain tax benefits, it demonstrates that the 
present system does not adequately encourage donors to make outright. 
gifts to charity. . 
Part III critiques recently enacted legislation that targets intellectual 
property charitable donations .. It argues that the current regime fails to 
incentivize socially desirable donations by eliminating any immediate 
financial incentives for intellectual property charitable donations. This 
Article identifies several problems with the regime's focus on post­
contribution economic incentives, which negatively favors income­
generating intellectual property over other forms and favors 
commercially-driven donees over educational donees and other donees 
committed to basic science research. Part IV proposes asystem based on ­
immediate incentives to encourage social giving through the use of 
Section 263A(h) paves the way for writers, artists, and painters to immediately deduct their 
"qualified creative expenses." I.R.C. §§ 162, 263A(h). For a thorough discussion of the tax 
treatment of patent and copyright development costs, see }EFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAo 
N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND LITIGATION IsSUES 
(2003}. 
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valuation premiums, rigorous enforcement mechanisms, and enhanced 
donee accountability. To achieve optimal social giving, this Article 
proposes an elective deduction regime whereby intellectual property 
donors may choose to realize immediate tax benefits upon contribution 
or to enjoy deductions in post-contribution years to the extent the 
charitable donee generates income from the intellectual property. 
I. THE ART OF GIVING 
Giving9 takes many forms. People give their time and talent to 
volunteer at community centers, hospitals, churches, and schools. Some · 
devote years of their lives to missionary works; to volunteer in such 
organizations as the Peace Corps,10 AmeriCorp,11 and Habitat for 
Humanity;12 and to serve in the military on missions that vary from 
peacekeeping to humanitarian aid. Others decide to donate their prized 
collections of art and artifacts to their institutions of choice.13 
9 For the jurisprudence of giving as opposed to taking by the government, see 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Giuings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 563 (2001). Professors 
Bell and Parchomovsky elegantly map the jurisprudence of giving that includes: (a) 
physica.l giving where "the government bestows a property interest upon a private actor"; 
(b) regulatory giving, "when a government enhancement of property value by means of 
regulation goes too far"; and (c) derivative giving, "when, as a result of a government 
giving or taking, surrounding property increases in value even though no direct giving has 
occurred." Id.· This Article uses the term "giving" in the context of charity: 
.to Peace Corps, What Is the Peace Corps? Webpage, http:/ /www.peacecorps.gov/ 
index.cfm?shell:;:leam.whatispc (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating that since Peace Corps's 
inception, there have been more than 182,000 Peace Corps volunteers in 138 host countries). 
11 Corp. for Nat'l & Cmty Serv., What Is AmeriCorps? Webpage, http://www. 
americorps.org/about/ac/index.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (explaining that 
AmeriCorps volunteer programs ranging from building affordable housing to providing 
disaster relief). · 
12 Habitat for Humanity, Annual Report FY 2003: Message from Our Founder and 
Prt:sident, http:/ /www.habitat.org/giving/repcirt/2003/letters.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2006) (stating that Habitat for Humanity built 150,000th house on July 1, 2003); see also 
Habitat for Humanity Int'l, Jimmy Carter Work Project 2005, http:/ /www.habitat. 
. org/jcwp/2005/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (describing Jimmy Carter Work Project 2005 to 
build houses by volunteers). · 
13 The Dallas Museum of Art received three extensive art collections valued at $400 
million from the Hoffmans, Rachofskys, and Roses. Dallas Museum of Art Receivi11g 
Collections, BosTON.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, http:/ /www.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles 
/2005/02/16/dallas_museum_of_art_to_get_art_donations. The donations comprised the 
largest combined gift in the museum's history. Id. The gifts "seed the future with new 
opportunities for exhibitions, research, programs and discoveries.'' Id.; see also Ralph 
Blumenthal, Major Gifts of Cash and Art for Texas Museums, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at E1; 
Florence Griswold Museum, American Naive Paintings from the National Gallery of Art, 
http:/ /www.tfaoi.com/newsmu/nmus78a.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (itldicating that 
collections of American folk paintings at National Galleries were generous· gifts and 
bequests made by Garbisch); Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Arts of the Americas, 
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All charitable donations, ranging from the small daily atts of giving to 
organized philanthropic efforts, benefit society.14 Accordingly, charitable 
giving has been central to the United States and its national character for 
centuries.15 In the earliest days of European settlement, John Winthrop 
told the Puritans sailing to the Massachusetts Bay Colony that to succeed 
in the new land, they needed to be a model of Christian charity .16 In the 
early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the philanthropy of notables 
such as Peabody, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford left a strong imprint on 
society. George Peabody, regarded as the founder of modern 
philanthropy, was a remarkable New England international banker who 
became America's first great educational philanthropist.17 The 
Rockefeller Foundation's gifts affected medical research, education, and 
public health in Europe, the Soviet Union, and China from World War I 
http:/ /www.mfa.org/collections/index.asp?key=17 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (introducing 
important gifts in Arts of Americas collections); George O'Bannon, The Ballard Collection, 
http:/ /www.rugreview.com/113ball.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (describing collections 
of oriental rugs given to various museums); The Metropolitan Museum of Art, American 
Folk Art in The Metropolitan Museum of Art, www.tfaoi.com/newsml/nlml35.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2006) (reporting exhibit of American Folk Art where collections were mostly 
gifts and bequests); The Metro. Museum of Art, Works of Art: European Paintings, 
http:/ /w-Ww.metmuseum.org/Works_of_Art/introduction.asp?dep=ll (last visited Mar. 
3, 2006) (introducing and discussing various gifts and bequests to European Paintings 
Collection at Metropolitan Museum of Art); The Metro. Museum of Art, Works of Art: The 
Robert Lehman Collection, http:/ /www.metmuseum.org/Works_of_Art/ 
introduction.asp?dep=15 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (introducing Robert Lehman Collection 
to Metropolitan Museum of Art as part of permanent collection). 
14 In 2004, overall private giving by individuals, foundations, and corporations totaled 
$248.52 billion. The Found. Ctr., The State of Foundation Giving, 2005, 
http: I I fdncenter .org I research/ trends_analysis I pdf/yearbook05_ch01.pdf (last ·visited 
Mar. 3, 2006); see also Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the 
Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1145, 1146 (2003). (noting important role of 
community foundations and trusts that provide philanthropic grants to combat poverty 
and support arts and cultural causes). · 
15 See Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive 
Market, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 388, 390-93 (2003) (tracing and analyzing history of public 
charity and philanthropy in United States). Charitable organizations contribute 
substantially to the_ arts, cultures, hospital cares, higher education, secondary education, 
day care, vocational training, and family counseling. See David C. Hammack & Dennis R. 
Young, Perspectives on Nonpro.fits in the Marketplace, in NONPROFIT bRGANIZATIONS IN A 
MARKET ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING NEW ROLES, IsSUES AND TRENDS 1, 4-5 (David C. 
Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds., 1993). 
16 Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin., Opening Remarks at the 
Hearing on Charities and Charitable Giving: Proposals for Reform (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file 
with author). 
17 The George Peabody Library provides information about George Peabody and his 
philanthropy. See The George Peabody Library, History Webpage, http:/ /www.peabody 
events.library.jhu.edu/history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006). 
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through the Cold War.18 The industrialist Andrew Carnegie established 
the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911 to promote "the 
advancement diffusion of knowledge and understanding," funding 
projects in the areas of education, international peace and security, 
international development, and the strengthening of U.S. democracy.19 
Henry and Edsel Ford created the Ford Foundation with gifts and 
bequests to be a resource for innovative people and institutions · 
worldwide.20 . 
Furthermore, in the last twenty years, changes in technology have 
tremendously impacted virtually every aspect of the economy, society, 
and charitable giving.21 Technological changes have facilitated the 
growth of private wealth held by individuals and corporate entities.22 
·Indeed, in the late 1990s, the Internet boom and robust economy were 
the key factors for the accumulation of personal wealth.23 Along with the 
new wealth came concerns about philanthropy.24 Potential donors 
18 See generally ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY AND MODERN BIOMEDICINE: 
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE COLD WAR (William H. Schneider 
ed., 2002) (detailing Rockefeller Foundation's efforts to establish global biomedical 
programs in first half of 20th century). 
19 Carnegie Corporation of New York Webpage, http:/ /www.carnegie.org (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2006). 
2° Ford Foundation, Who Are We, http:/ /www.fordfound.org/about/mission.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
21 See PREsiDENT'S INFo; TECH. ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE PREsiDENT: 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REsEARCH: INvEsTING IN OUR FuTuRE 23 (1999), available at 
http:/ /www.nitrd.gov/pitac/report/pitac_report.pdf ("As we approach the new 
millennium, it is clear that the 'information infrastructure'- the inter-connected networks 
of computers, devices, and software -may have a greater impact on worldwide social and 
economic structures than all networks that have preceded them."); id. at 47 ("Within the 
next two decades, the Internet will have penetrated more deeply into our society than the 
telephone, radio, television, transportation, and electric power distribution networks have 
today. For many of us, the Internet has already become an integral part of our daily 
lives."); see also Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Changes: 
The Example ofIn Vitro Fertili:Zation, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 505, 512 (2005) ("[A]n account 
of the historical development of technology might describe technological change as a. 
process of knowledge change, increasing the ability or potential of a people or society to 
solve problems."). See generally MCKENZIE WARK, A HACKER MANIFESTO (2004) (discussing 
impact of information technology on law, politics, and society). 
22 See The Found. Ctr., supra note 14 (providing charts that illustrate increase in 
personal wealth accumulated as direct result of tremendous growth in technology). 
23 See id. 
, 
24 See Susan R. Jones, Lawyering for a New Democracy: Current Issues in the Changing 
Roles and Practices of Community Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REv. 437, 443 
("[M]ulti-millionaires of the booming technology industries are changing the way 
philanthropy is approached."); see also Jed Emerson, In Brief Giving, Study Shows Gifts by 
Entrepreneurs, OmoN. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 30, 2000, ; David Whitford, The New Shape of 
Philanthropy: The Internet Generation Is Bringing the Principles of Venture Capital to 
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searched for optimum ways to give their accumulated wealth, and a new 
breed of donors was born. Multimillionaires and billionaires from the 
technology industry approached philanthropy with venture capitalist 
principles, seeking a maximum return of social impact from their 
giving.25 The Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation,26 for example, has 
surpassed the philanthropic notables of yesteryear, spearheading 
postmodem philanthropy by directing the Gates's newly accumulated 
wealth toward charitable giving.27 In addition, technology-savvy 
individuals have turned to the Internet and developed e-philanthropy as 
anew approach to maximize social good.28 
The wealth accumulated during this recent technological revolution 
has spawned an increase in the number of charitable organizations.29 In 
2001, charitable foundations reached record asset holdings,30 and today, 
countless websites offer advice to prospective donors, matching them 
with potential donees, projects, and causes.31 A recent study showed that 
Philanthropy. It's Innovative- But Is It Effective?, FORTUNE, June 12, 2000, at 315. 
25 Karl Taro Greenfeld, A New Way of Giving, TIME, July 24, 2000, at 48, 51 ("This new 
breed of philanthropist scrutinizes each charitable cause like a potential business 
investment, seeking maximum return in terms of social impact- for example, by counting 
the number of children taught to read or the number inoculated against malaria."). 
Similarly, a new challenge faced by both donors and grantees is the trend toward chipping 
away the "variance power." Sidel, supra note 14, at 1150. The variance power, which 
allows community foundations and trusts to alter the dispositions of their donors, is the 
"legal pillar that has freed American con:ununity philanthropy to search for innovation and 
support pioneering yet unpopular ideas and policies." Id. at 1147, 1150. This is important 
because tension often lies where the grantees would like unrestricted forms of giving while 
the philanthropists would like to maintain some control over the gifts. Id. at 1149 (stating 
that unrestricted form of giving "is wannly welcomed bycommunity foundations because 
it allows maximum flexibility in the dispersal of funds," while "many philanthropists are 
somewhat wary of such open-ended gifts, because they would like to re.tain some role in 
the selection of charitable recipients"). 
26 See Jon Cronin, Bill Gates: Billionaire Philanthropist, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2005, 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3913581.stm (reporting. that, since its inception in 
2000, Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation has given more than $7 billion to global health 
and learning). 
27 Richard Williamson, Gates Surpasses the Late Greats ofPhilanthropy, NONPROFIT TIMES, 
. Jan. 1, 2000, http:/ /www.nptimes.com/JanOO/janfrol.hbnl (reporting information about 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's programs worldwide). 
28 See, e.g., Greenstar Foundation, £-Philanthropy: Changing Our Way of Giving (Aug. 
1999), http://www.greenstar~org/e-philanthropy/. 
29 The Found..Ctr., supra note 14 (reporting that rapid rise in personal wealth led 
individuals to create many charitable foundations). 
30 Id. 
31 See Michael Coren, Charities Find Dollars on the Internet, CNN.COM, Dec. 20, 2004, 
http;/ /www,cnn.com/2004/TECH/intemet/12/15/giving.intemet/ (reporting that 
websites assist "a new generation of philanthropists [in] find[ing] causes close to their 
hearts and homes by allowing potential donors to search charities by zip code, state and 
1730 University.of California, Davis [Vol. 39:1721 
49% of Americans volunteer their time for civic activities, and nearly 75% 
of Americans make financial contributions to charities.32 These 
donations to foundations, institutions, and organizations promote social 
welfare in various areas of philanthropy.33 
Dependent on charitable generosity, potential charitable donees search 
for and court potential donors. As the role of government in public 
funding continues to diminish,34 nonprofit organizations co~ete for 
private support to fulfill and expand their charitable missions. Private 
donations are pivotal to offset the shrinking public funding of arts, 
science, social science, communications, education, health, research, 
religion, and democracy.36 Thus, an incentives-based system that 
facilitates giving is essential, not only to the donors and donees, but also 
to the development and growth of society. 
cause"); see, e.g., Charity Navigator Homepage, http:/ /www.charitynavigator.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
32 See Susan Raymond, Venture Philanthropy: An Idea Whose Time Has .Come, 
ONPHILANTHROPY, Aug. 15, 2000, http:/ /www.onphilanthropy.com/tren_comm/tc2001­
09-06j.html (reporting that according to recent study conducted by John Hopkins 
University, "49 percent of Americans volunteer their time for civic activities, compared to 
13 percent of Germans and 19 percent of the French" and that "[s]imilarly, nearly three 
quarters of Americans make financial contributions to charity, compared to 44 percent of 
Germans and 43 percent of the French"). 
33 Coren, supra note 31 (reporting increase in online donations to various charities and 
cau~es). 
34 Government funding increased only 2.9% for the period between 1992 ·and 1996, 
compared to 8.4% between 1987 and 1992. Jed Emerson, The U.S. Nonprofit Capital Market: 
An Introductory Overview of Developmental Stages, Investors and Funding Instruments 6 (1998), 
http:/ /www.insp.efc.be/ download.php?d=21&f=1. . 
35 Charitable entities provide social value and are a vital element to the building of the 
modern economy .. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUNDRAISING § 1.1, at 2-3 .(2d ed. 
1996) (stating that charities perform functions that relieve government from its obligation); 
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 (1980). With 
respect to corporate charitable giving, corporate management is often constrained "to 
choose recipients of the kind that government is under popular pressure to provide [for]." 
Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1191, 1214 
(2002). Such charitable giving "lessens the pressure for government funding" and offers 
attendant regulatory and tax incentives. Id. 
36 See Susan R. Jones, Representing the Poor and Homeless: Innovations in Advocacy 
Tackling Homelessness Through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 385, 4:09 
(2000) (illustrating, through ·various surveys, that private charity substantially 
complements government work). 
1731 2006] Giving Intellectual Property 
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE BENEFIT OF CHARITABLE 

OWNERSHIP 

A. Patents and Copyrights as Gifts 
Intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and 
trademarks, has become increasingly important in most sectors of the 
economy and society.37 The rapid growth of technology and information 
has enhanced companies' intellectual property ownership portfolios, as 
companies seek to protect their rights in their inventions and creative 
, works of authorship.38 Moreover, as the economy has become 
increasingly global and knowledge-based, the role of intellectual 
property has become vitally important.39 For example, the World Trade 
Organization, encompassing approximately 150 nations,40 imposes upon 
37 Alan Greenspan, Fed. Reserve Chainnan, Remarks Regarding Intellectual Property 
Rights at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit (Feb. 27, 
2004), available at http: I /www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/) 
(noting importance of information technology, and stating that "the emergence of an 
electronic platform for the transmission of ideas at negligible marginal cost may, therefore, 
be an important factor explaining the recent increased conceptualization of the GOP"); id. 
("Ideas are at the center of productivity growth. Multifactor productivity by definition 
attempts to capture product innovations and insights in the way that capital and labor are 
organized to produce output. Ideas are also embodied directly in the capital that we 
employ."); see also Merrill Matthews, Jr. & Tom Giovanetti, Why Intellectual Property Is 
Important, IDEAS, (lnst. for Policy Innovation, Lewisville, Tex), July 8, 2002, available at 
http:/ /www.ipi.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink, then follow "by Author" hyperlink) 
(stating that United States has become powerhouse of intellectual property as economy has 
shifted from industrial- to information-based economy and new creative class of workforce 
has replaced other groups of workers). 
38 
·Greenspan, supra note 37 {"[l]n recent decades, as the economic product of the 
United States has become so predominantly conceptual, [so] have issues related to the 
protection of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant ...."). Companies 
highly value their intellectual property assets. See,. e.g., IBM, Intellectual Property and 
Licensing, http:/ /www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("In 2005, IBM 
received 2,974 U.S. patentS from the USPTO. This is the. thirteenth consecutive year that 
IBM has received more US patents than any other company in the world. In addition to 
delivering these innovations through its products and services, IBM maintains an active 
patent and technology licensing program."). 
39 See Robin Cowan & Elad Harison, Intellectual Property Rights in a Knowledge-Based· 
Economy (MERIT-INFONOMICS Research Memorandum 2001), http:/ /ideas.repec.org/ 
p/dgr/umamer/2001026.html (discussing various doctrinal protections for different types 
of intellectual property in emergence of knowledge-based industries); see also Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, FTC and DO] to Hold Roundtable Discussions to Conclude Hearings on Competition 
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Oct. 18, 2002), http:/ /www.ftc.govI 
opaJ2002/10/intellecthbn; The . National Academies Homepage, http://www. 
nationalacademies.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating scope of national project to study 
role of intellectual property in knowledge-based economy). 
•o World Trade Org., Members and Observers, http:/ /www.wto.org/english/ 
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all nation-members systematic protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights within the global free trade movements. 41 Such a system · 
indicates the role of patents and copyrights, among other intellectual 
property rights, in shaping the present and future direction of th~ global, 
knowledge-based economy.42 . _ 
To compete globally, the United States embraces a legal system of 
strong intellectual property rights.43 Under U.S. intellectual property law; 
patents confer ownership for twenty years from the date of filing the 
patent application.44 The patent ownership encompasses the right to 
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or 
importing the patented invention.45 The owner of a patent is free to 
transfer all or part of the patent to others, and a transfer of patent 
ownership is recorded with the U.S. Patent Office.46 With respect to 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (stating that WTO has 149 
members as of December 2005). 
41 World Trade Org., Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http:/ /www.wto. 
org/english/tehwto_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last .visited Mar. 6, 2006) (discussing Uruguay 
Round, which established "minimum level of protection that each government has to give 
to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members"); World Trade Org., Overview: A 
Navigational Guide, http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/ agrm1_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("WTO agreements cover goods, services and intellectual 
property. They spell out the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. 
They include individual countries' commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade 
barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling 
disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require 
governments to make their trade· policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in 
force and measures adopted, and through regular reports by the secretariat on countries' 
trade policies."). 
· 
42 With the fast growth and importance of the Internet and e-conunerce, the WTO 
continues to play a central role in shaping the direction of governance of the new medium 
of global commerce. See generally Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, WTO, E-commerce, and 
Information Technologies, U.N. INFO. & COMM. TECH. TASK FORCE, available at 
http:/ /www.iie.com/publications/papers/wunsd)-1004.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) 
(discussing role of WTO in IT governance). 
43 In addition to having a legal protection system for intellectual property rights, the 
federal government implements a strong enforcement system at both the national and 
international levels. See generally E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Sec'y for Econ. & Bus. 
Affairs, Testimony Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies (Apr. 23, 2002), 
http:/ /www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2002/9645.htm (describing U.S. Department of 
State's role in enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights through foreign policy). 
« There are three different patent categories: utility, plant, and design. Margo A. 
Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 469, 484 n.54 (2003). A utility or plant patent is valid for 20 years from the 
date of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2004). A design patent is effective for 14 years from the date 
of grant. 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
40 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). 
46 Under patent law, the applicant, patentee, or his assignee may grant and convey "an 
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copyright law, the term of crotection for a copyright is the life of the 
author plus seventy years. If the author is an entity, the term of 
protection lasts for 120 years from the date of creation or ninety-five 
years from the date of publication.48 A copyright is a form of protection 
provided to the authors of original works of authorship including 
literary, dramatic, musical, audiovisual, artistic, architectural, and 
pictorial works and sound recordings.49 Software is also a work of 
authorship entitled to copyright. protection.50 The copyright grant 
subsists in the reproduction, derivative, distribution, public display, and 
exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified 
part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). If. the assignment, grant, or conveyance is 
not recorded with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its 
issuance, it will be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration. 
Id. 
47 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2000). 
's Id. 
49 The Copyright Act sets forth that: 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. 
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend. to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, .explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work. 
17 U.S.C. §102(a)-(b) (2000). 
50 Software code may be source code or object.code. Source code is "[h]uman-readable 
program statements written by a programmer or developer in a high-level or assembly 
language that are not directly readable by a computer" and "needs to be compiled into 
object code before it can be executed by a computer." M!CROSOFf CORP., MICROSOFT 
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 418 (1999). Object code is "[t]he code, generated by a compiler or 
an assembler, that was translated from the source code of a program." Id. at 317. Software 
code is considered a "literary work" within the meaning of the Copyright Act because 
software code is expressed in "verbal or numerical symbols or indicia." 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (finding that computer programs fall within terms of Copyright Act); Mathias 
Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual Property lAw? The Case Against Open Source, 2001 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) ("Since Section 101(a) defines the concept of 'literary work' 
broadly, encompassing 'words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,' 
and since the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended that concept to 
encompass software in all its manifestations, it soon became clear that the Copyright Act 
covers both the source code and the object code of software."). 
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public performance rights of the work.51 The author of a copyright can, 
by executed contract, assign all or part of his or her exclusive rights to a 
third party.52 The assignment of ownership is recorded with the U.S. 
Copyright Office. 5 3 
B. Benefits ofIntellectual Property Ownership by Charitable Organizations 
Modem theorists regard the firm as the repository of residual property 
rights, such as intangible intellectual property assets.54 The firm may 
assign these residual rights, such as patents, if it decides, upon internal 
evaluation, that they are no longer needed for the firm's functions in the 
51 The copyrightstatute provides that the components of a copyright include: 
the exclusive rights to do and to au~orize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
( 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 u.s.c. § 106(1)-(6). 
52 See generally I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The 'transfer of 
copyright ownership' is defined, in the Copyright Act, as an exclusive license or soine other 
instrument of conveyance. The definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license."); In 
re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Ownership is the 
sine qua non of the right to transfer, and the copyright law distinguishes between exclusive 
and nonexclusive licenses. A 'transfer of copyright ownership' includes the grant of an 
exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license."). 
53 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyrights, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 493 (2004) 
(discussing recording of ownership transfer requirement). 
54 Initial ownership of a patent is with the inventor, but the ownership can be 
transferred. See, e.g., Jerry C. Liu, Overview of Patent Ownership Considerations in Joint 
Technology Development, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1; William Lynch Schaller, 
Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Considerations for Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to 
Expand, 35 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 845, 912 (2004) (stating that only individuals can qualify as 
inventors for purposes of applying for patent, thus, in order for company to own and apply 
for patent; "ownership of the invention must be transferred to the company by written 
assignment from an individual"). 
1735 2006] Giving Intellectual Property 
market. In such cases, the firm grants ownership in the intellectual 
property assets to an assignee-donee. 55 Donating residual patents to 
charitable organizations, such as educational and research institutions, 
enables the firm to control its competitors' access to those intellectual 
property rights. · 
Moreover, as the new owner of a patent, the assignee enjoys all the 
rights conferred under patent law.56 For example, if the charity is a 
university, its researchers, graduate students, and undergraduate 
students e~oy the right to use the patent in their scientific investigation 
and study. If the patent covers a particular method, the university can 
conduct experiments using the method without obtaining a license from 
the assignor. 58 
Rather than assigning or donating the patent to a charitable 
organization altogether, the firm may alternatively execute a license to 
use the patent to a charitable organization. A license is generally nothing 
more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee,59 as long as 
the licensee follows all the conditions set forth under the license 
55 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall 
be assignable in law by an instrument in writing."). 
56 The assignee enjoys the patent grant, which confers the right .to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention. 
Furthermore, as the assignee of inventions, a university is entitled to prosecute the 
applications and to make amendments during prosecution. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. 
Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding that 
university assignee may correctly prosecute and amend applications during prosecution of 
patent applications). 
57 Universities usually have their own patent policies. For example, a university may 
embrace a policy that it owns all patents and inventions created by its employees during 
their time of employment. See, e.g., Univ. of W.Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Van Voorhies, 342 F.3d 
1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether university's patent policy reaches second­
generation patents). 
55 If the patent covers a research tool or method, the· desire to have ownership is even 
greater because universities cannot rely on the experimental exception in their use of the 
patented tool or method to further their own investigation. See Elizabeth Rowe, The 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special 
Treatment? 1 (unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http:/ /papers.ssrn.com 
(arguing that universities should be liable for patent infringement if they use patented 
research tool or method in their investigation without permission in hopes that 
experimental exception works in their favor). 
59 See generally Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) ("[L]icenses are considered as nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue 
the licensee."); id. ("[Under a license agreement], title to the patent does not change hands . 
. . . However, assignments pass title to the patentee's rights, with all the accompanying 
rights of ownership, from the patentee to the assignee."). Unlike assignments, patent 
licenses are not recorded in the Patent Office Assignment branch. See Laurence H. Pretty, 
Issues of Ownership of Intellectt111l Property Assets Arising in a Deal Context, 751 PLI/PAT 9, 19 
(2003) (stating that Patent Office "assignment record does not record patent licenses"). 
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agreement.60 If the licensee, however, uses the patent beyond the scope 
of the license grant, the licensee is in breach of the license and infringes 
.the patent.61 Thus, to a charitable organization, having a license, rather 
than owning a patent outright, means having a restricted right to use the 
patent with all the limitations described in the license agreement.62 
These limitations may include the ability to use the patent only for 
certain defined purposes,63 within identified laboratories belonging to 
particular investigators or for certain periods of time.64 Limits on the 
patent's purpose and temporal and geographical limitations,65 among 
others,66 may hinder investigation and studies based on the subject patent 
if certain uses constitute a breach of the license agreement and 
infringement on the patent.67 Furthermore, costs associated with patent 
litigation are exorbitant and may serve to reinforce the licensee's fear of 
using the patent beyond the limitations.68 
60 See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
("[O]nce the license agreement was in place and [licensee] was in compliance with the 
terms of the agreement, [licensee] could not be under reasonable apprehension that it 
would face infringement suit by [licensor]."). 
61 See generally Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(affirming patent infringement fulding where licensee breached license agreement that 
included several restrictions, including prohibition of replanting second generation of 
seeds). 
62 
· See, e.g., Mary J. Hildebrand, Software Licensing, 786 PLI/PAT 513, 516-37 (2004) 
{setting forth issues for consideration in software licensing); Mary M. Squyres, Global 
Licensing: A License to Use, 824 PLI/PAT 363, 367-400 (2005) (indicating various terms and 
restrictions included in license to use). · 
63 See Ethan Horwitz, Patent and High Technology Licensing, 831 PU/PAT 57, 67-68 
(2005) (discussing "field of use" restriction). 
64 ld. at 68-69 (discussing license term). , 
65 Id. at 67-68 (discussing territory restriction in patent and technology license 
agreements). 
66 Id. at 69 (providing reservation of rights by licensor). 
67 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke 'univ., 307 F.3d ·1351; 1352-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(demonstrating license use problem). Madey was a prominent researcher in the 
Department of Physics at Duke University and held several patents relating to the 
performance of free electron laser ("FEL") technology. Id. at 1352. After Madey was 
relieved from his post at Duke, some members of the university and research collaborators 
used the FEL equipment that remained at the university after Madey's departure. Id. 
Subsequently, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement; Id. The Federal Circuit rejected 
Duke's argument that its nonprofit and educational status was adequate proof of the 
experimental exception to infringement. Id. The court held that the infringing use was to 
further the university's legitimate business objectives of: (1) educating and enlightening 
faculty, researchers, and students; (2) enhancing Duke's status; and (3) attracting additional 
research grants and talented faculty and students. Id. at 1362. 
68 Litigation costs include not only breach of license agreement claims, but also patent 
infringement claims. See John Flock, Patent Licensing: Outlines, 825 PLI/PAT 227, 235 
(2005) (stating that when licensee uses patent beyond scope of license grant, licensee faces 
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A license may generate other uncertainties and administrative burdens 
as well. Who at the charity will negotiate the license agreement? Will 
that person possess an understanding of all the limitations indicated in 
the license agreement? Will that person be able to communicate the 
limitations to those who desire to use the patent license in their 
investigation and study? Who will monitor the use of the patent to 
insure compliance with the limitations? Most charitable organizations 
do not have technology transfer offices to handle patent incoming license 
concerns, 
69 
and even those organizations fortunate enough to have 
technology transfer offices generally understaff such offices.70 
Most charitable organizations are unwilling or ill-equipped to deal 
with the limitations and uncertainties associated with the unattractive 
process of obtaining a license to use a patent.71 Thus, many prefer to 
obtain the outright ownership of the patent.72 As an assignee, as opposed 
to a licensee, a charity has unrestricted use of a patent, eliminating any 
uncertainties. Consequently, the charity can limit costs incidental to 
obtaining a patent license or arising from the use of the patent under the 
license agreement. · 
The outright assignment of a patent means the charitable assignee 
possesses its own portfolio of patents. The charity can use the donated 
both breach of contract and patent infringement claims). Likewise, in cases relating to a 
licensee's use of a copyright beyond the scope of the license grant, both claims of breach of 
contract and copyright infringement are present. In a recent case where the licensee 
breached the license agreement and infringed the copyrights, the jury awarded the plaintiff 
$19 million in damages. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc.,271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 
741-44 (D. Md. 2003). . 
69 Generally, universities with technology transfer offices focus on the outgoing 
technology licenses, where the universities license their innovations to the commercial 
sectors in exchange for royalty income. See, e.g., Univ. of Cal.,· University Technology 
Transfer- Questions and Answers Webpage, www.ucop.edu/ott/tech.html (explaining 
university technology transfers and licensing programs) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); see also 
Gina C. Freschi, Navigating the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor: Supreme Court to Clarify 
Scope- Implications for Stem Cell Research in California, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 855, 888 (2005) ("[Technology] transfer is the formal transferring of new 
discoveries and innovation resulting from scientific research conducted at universities to 
the commercial sector."); Amy Kapczynski, Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1041 (2005) 
("[Through] technology transfer licenses[,] universities negotiate with drug companies 
engaged in commercializiJ1g the universities' academic discoveries."). 
70 See Univ. of Cal., supra note 69. 
71 Indeed, since university technology transfer offices mainly address issues relating to 
the outgoing of technology, such as disclosure, publication, and license agreements with 
the private sector, they do not have enough staff to focus solely on obtaining licenses on 
behalf of their researchers. See supra notes 69-70. 
72 See generally Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d ,1026, 1030-35 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (explaining and contrasting rights of patent owner and licensee). 
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patents to further its own investigation and study that may lead to the 
creation of future inventions and thus ownership of new patents. 
Moreover, the charity can then rely on its own enhanced portfolio to 
attract new talents, funding, and investment.73 
With respect to copyrights, when a firm gifts a copyright to a charity,· 
the charity receives the unfettered rights provided under U.S. copyright · 
law. As the assignee of the copyright gift, the charity possesses the 
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative 
works, to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly, and to display the copyrighted 
work publicly.74 
Furthermore, with outright ownership of the copyright in a particular 
work, the charity, specifically its researchers and educators, do not have 
to obtain permission75 or rely on the "fair use" doctrine to use the 
copyrighted work. This is especially advantageous because the fair use 
doctrine presents many uncertainties, and the distinction between fair 
use and infringement is difficult to define in some cases. 76 These 
73 Intellectual property portfolios have become valuable assets and important tools to 
attract investment and venture capital. See generally Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of 
Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L.& TECH. 4, 28­
29 (2004) (discussing origin of property rights in information goods in face of new digital 
markets for content). 
74 Among the statutory exclusive rights, the right to prepare derivative works has been 
expanded, in some cases too broadly, essentially providing "copyright owners the right to 
control interesting, creative, and culturally significant reuses of their works." Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves 
It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004). 
75 Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[WJe hold that the 1976 Act 
· does not allow a copyright licensee to transfer its rights under an exclusive license, without 
the consent of the original licensor."). 
76 Determining fair use requires a case-by-case approach many have criticized as being 
unworkable. See, e.g., Michael J. Iyiadison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1530-35 (advocating for pattern-oriented approach to fair use to achieve 
more consistent and predictable fair use jurisprudence). See generally Andrew Chin, 
Antitrust Analysis in Software Product Markets: The First Principle Approach, 18 HARv. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 71 (2004) (noting that fair use doctrine application is fact-specific and uncertain); 
Tushnet, supra note 74, at 545 (noting that successful fair use defense is expensive and risk 
of litigation deters scholars and publishers from building on prior works and investing in 
potentially infringing works). Under the fair use doctrine, the use of a copyrighted work 
may be considered "fair" if the purpose is for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, or research. See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and 
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REv. 135, 153-54 (2004) (discussing fair use doctrine). There are 
four factors to consider in determining whether or not a particular use is fair: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
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uncertainties, coupled with the cumbersome process of acqwrmg 
permission, make anything other than full ownership of the copyright 
somewhat onerous. Further, if the charity negotiates for a license to use 
certain copyrights, as a licensee of a nonexclusive copyright license, it 
will face limitations and constraints similar to those associated with a 
patent license as described above.77 
Charitable donees clearly prefer to become assignees rather than 
licensees of patents and copyrights through outright gifts from donors. 
The question arises, then, whether there is a system currently available to 
encourage the firm that would like to completely assign its intellectual 
property assets to a particular charity.78 The current charitable tax 
deduction scheme requires a donor to give its entire. interest (or 
undivided interest) in donated property to a qualified charity .. More 
specifically, no income tax deduction is allowed for contributions of 
partial interests in property, defined as an "interest in property which 
consiSts of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property."79 
copyrighted work. See id. Decisional authority indicates that there is no definite number of 
words, lines, paragraphs, notes, or excerpts that may safely be reproduced to ensure that 
the use is a "fair use" and not an act of infringement. See Tushnet, supra note 74, at 545-46 
(highlighting notorious decisions relating to fair use doctrine's application, and noting 
infringement of right to make derivative works). Acknowledging the source of the 
copyrighted material also does not necessarily insulate the user from an infringement suit. 
See Roger L. Zissu, Copyright Luncheon Circle: The Interplay of Copyright and Trademark in the 
Protection of Character Rights with Observations on Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 453, 456-62 (2004) (citing example of such infringement 
. suit). 
77 If a licensee uses a copyright in violation of the terms and restrictions stated in the 
license agreement, the licensee risks an infringement action. See generally United States v. 
King Features Entm't. Inc., 843 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that licensee of copyrighted 
work violated copyright licensing agreement which did not permit cartoon viewing on 
dosed-circuit military television or on foreign military bases). 
78 Commentators have noted that in the world of charity giving, "donors prefer to 
avail themselves of the charitable contribution deduction." Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post­
September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable 
to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REv. 1, 17 (2003). 
Thus, the incentive system centers on the availability of tax deductions. Id. at 22 (noting 
that numerous studies suggest that federal tax laws impact philanthropy); see also CHARLES 
T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 288 (1985); Gerald E. Auten 
et al., The Effects of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 267, 267 (1992); 
Charles A. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy.and Charitable Giving, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: 
STUDIES IN VARIETIES A.NI) GOALS 105, 124 (Richard Magat ed., 1989); Joseph Cordes, The 
Cost of Giving: How Do Changes in Tax Deductions Affect Charitable Contributions?, EMERGING 
ISSUES IN PHILANTROPY: SEMINAR SERIES (The Urban lnst., D.C.), 2001, at 1-3, available at 
http:/ /www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philanthropy_2.pdf; William C. Randolph, 
Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. 
ECON. 709, 735 (Aug. 1995). 
79 I.R.C. § 170(£)(2)-(3) (2006). There are exceptions, however, if the partial interest is a 
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With respect to donated patents, for example, a donor may not take a 
charitable deduction if he or she retains any substantial right in the 
donated patent. In order to qualify for an income tax charitable 
deduction under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), the 
taxpayer must transfer "all substantial rights" in a patent, defined as "all 
rights which are of value at the time the rights to the patent are 
transferred."80 In addition, a patent subject to a conditional reversion is 
not deductible unless the likelihood of the triggering event occurring is 
so remote as to be negligible.81 Assume, for example, that a donor's 
contribution of a patent to a university is contingent upon a certain 
professor remaining as a member of the university's faculty for the rest 
of the patent's life, which is fifteen years. Under these facts, the donor 
would not be entitled to a charitable deduction because on the date of 
the contribution the possibility that the professor will no longer be a 
member of the university's faculty for fifteen years is considered "not so 
remote as to be negligible."82 
With respect to copyright donations, a copyright creator must donate 
both the copyright and the tangible work embodying the copyright in 
order to realize a tax deduction. For example, no income tax deduction 
is allowed at all if an artist donates his or her painting to a charity but 
charitable remainder interest in a trust. More specifically, a deduction is allowed for a 
contribution of a remainder interest in trust if the trust is: (1) a charitable remainder 
annuity trust, (2) a charitable remainder unitrust, or (3) a pooled income fund. I.R.C. §§ 
170(f)(2)(A), 664(d}(1H2). For nontrust transfers, a deduction is allowed for a remainder 
interest in personal residences or farms. Id. 
It should be noted that in Notice 2004-7, the IRS stated that it "intends to disallow 
improper charitable deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of 
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 
2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 set forth four situations arising out of intellectual property 
transfers to charitable organizations that will be closely scrutinized, including the transfer 
of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual property. Id. 
Although donations of partial interests do not qualify for the income tax charitable 
deduction, donations of "undivided interests" do qualify. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3}(B)(ii). 
80 See Rev. Rul. 2003-28,2003-1 C.B. 594 (citing Treas. Reg.§ 1.1235-2(b)(1) (2006)). The 
"all substantial rights" test is primarily used to help determine whether a patent transfer 
constitutes a sale (capital gains treatment) or a license (ordinary income treatment). The 
test, however, is also useful in analyzing the tax treatment of a charitable donation. 
81 Id. (citing Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(e)). 
82 Id. The regulations provide an example of a condition that is considered negligible 
so as to qualify for a tax deduction. Id. ("A transfers land to a city govenunent for as long 
as the land is used by the city for a public park. If, on the date of the gift, the city does plan 
to use the land for a park, and the possibility that the city will not use the land for a public 
park is so remote as to be negligible, A is entitled to a deduction under section 170 for his 
charitable contribution."). 
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not the copyright on the painting.83 Likewise, no income tax charitable 
deduction is allowed if a taxpayer donates an original, historic motion 
picture film to a charity, but retains the exclusive right to make 
reproductions of such films and to exploit such reproductions.84 In order 
for a donor to qualify for an income tax charitable deduction in these 
examples, both the copyright and the work embodying the copyright 
(the original painting or film) must be given to the charitable 
organization. Merely donating the film or painting without the 
copyright would be considered a donation of a nondeductible partial 
interest in the property.85 · . 
Although the tax system requires intellectual property donors to make 
complete assignments to charities to obtain any deduction, the question 
arises whether the system adequately encourages donors to make outright 
"
3 Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-7(b)(1). 
84 Id. 
85 In this regard, an interesting disconnect exists between federal copyright law and 
federal income tax law. Under federal copyright law, the ownership of a copyright or any 
exclusive rights under the copyright is distinct from ownership of any material object in 
which the work is embodied. See Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 367 
(D.C. Mo. 1983) (holding ownership of copyright distinct from ownership of physical object 
in which copywritten work is embodied); :Michael Todd Co., Inc. v. L.A. County, 57 Cal. 2d 
684, 691 (1962) (holding copyright ownership is intangible property distinct from any 
property interest in material object copyrighted). Transfer of ownership of any material 
object, including the copy or recording in which the work is first fixed, does not itself 
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object. See Nika, 582 F. Supp. at 
367; Michael Todd, 57 Cal. 2d at 691. With respect to federal income tax law, however, the 
two pieces of property - the intangible copyright and the tangible painting - are treated 
as one. In other words, for tax purposes, a copyright is not distinct from any material 
object in which the copyright is embodied. 
While federal income tax law is iriconsistent with copyright law, it is also 
inconsistent with federal estate and gift tax law. In 1981, Congress aligned the gift and 
estate tax provisions with federal copyright law so that in the case of a "qualified 
contribution" of a "work. of art," the work of art and the copyright on it shall be treated cts 
separate properties. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(4)(A) (2006). In contrast to the income tax charitable 
deduction provision, the estate and gift tax charitable deduction provisions expressly allow 
for the treatment of a tangible work of art and the copyright on the work as two distinct 
properties, allowing a gift or estate tax deduction for the transfer of either of these 
properties to a. charitable organization. See id. § 2055(e)(4) (stating that copyright and 
tangible personal property will be treated as items of i;iepar<,lte property for purposes of 
estate tax charitable deduction); id. § 2522{c)(3) (stating same treatment for gift tax 
charitable deduction). Accordingly, an estate tax charitable deduction would be allowed if 
a decedent willed a painting to a charity, but left the copyright on the painting to her heirs. 
There is no apparent explanation for the inconsistency between the federal income tax 
charitable deduction and the federal gift and estate tax charitable provisions. The effect, 
though, is that an artist would not be entitled to an income tax· deduction if she made an 
inter vivos gift of a painting to a charity (keeping the copyright), but would be entitled to 
an estate tax deduction if she gave the painting to the charity at her death (and the 
copyright interest passed to an heir). 
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gifts to charity. Since owning patents and copyrights is equal to having a 
monopoly in those patents and copyrights for a specific duration of time, 
what are the driving factors persuading the firm, as the repository of 
residual property rights,to surrender its monopoly?86 Under the U.S. 
Constitution, the owner of the patent or copyright and society have a 
bargain: the owner enjoys the monopoly during a certain time period,87 
and society enjoys the patent or copyright once it becomes part of the 
public domain88 at the conclusion of the time limit.89 Why should the 
firm, as the repository of residual property rights, give up its bargain 
prematurely, unless there are incentives to facilitate and encourage the 
ending of the monopoly and the transferring of the ownership into the 
hands of charitable institutions?90 The firm could very well enjoy the 
86 See Sony Corp. of Am.~- Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1983) (ruling that 
limited monopoly in copyright or patent "is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access 
to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired"); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts."'). 
87 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The 
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 
'Progress of Science and useful Arts."'); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
229 (1964) ("Patents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage invention by 
rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to 
exclude others from the use of his invention."); see also Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That­
A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public 
Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 599-600 (1996) (emphasizing 
"economic and cultural bargain between authors and users [are] ... at the heart of U.S. 
[copyright] law, as reflected in the Patent and Copyright Clause [of the Constitution], and a 
parade of Supreme Court precedents"). See generally J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. 
Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with 
Public Good Uses oJ Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 897 (1999) (discussing Bargain 
between authors and legislators). 
88 The concept of "public domain" upon the expiration of the patent monopoly was 
first addressed in the Singer case. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 196-97 
(1896). 
89 Indeed, the patentee has no right to collect royalties after the patent enters the public 
domain upon the expiration date. See generally Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) 
("[T]he exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired is an assertion 
of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when . . . the patent has entered the 
public domain."). 
90 Under property-based theories of the firm, the proprietary rights in the intellectual 
property assets serve to coordinate and allocate intrafirm activities as well as interfirm 
functions in the market. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. That means the role of 
intellectual property is crucial to firms and they would not easily sever the ownership of 
the intellectual property. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Hence, regulations 
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fruit of its ownership by selling the intellectual property monopoly for 
its current fair market value. By donating the intellectual property 
assets, the firm forfeits the potential income generated by and from the 
asset.91 Unless financial incentives exist that reflect the value of the 
intellectual property in the knowledge-based economy and thus serve as 
a significant motivating force for donating, the firm will continue to keep 
the monopoly until the time limit expires.92 Charitable organizations will 
only be able to obtain the benefits of the intellectual property through the 
onerous process of seeking licenses. As a consequence, the charity and 
its charitable missions will be hindered, since a license must be 
negotiated, permissions must be obtained, and limitations dictated by 
the licensor must be obeyed. 
Ill. DISINCENTIVIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHARITABLE GIVING 
Since 1917, the government has provided a financial mcentive for 
taxpayers to transfer money and property . to charities by giving 
taxpayers an immediate tax deduction for their donations. 93 Although 
this economic incentive has been costly from a federal revenue 
standpoint,94 promoting socially efficient donations represents sound 
policy. By encouraging private philanthropy, the charitable deduction 
minimizes the need for direct government subsidies to those 
organizations and prevents the government from allocating subsidies as 
enacted to motivate and encourage firms to sever such ownership must contemplate the 
value intellectual property assets provide to the firm's functions. See infra Part IV. 
91 Assignment of intellectual property rights by the fum means that it will have no 
title, interest, or right in the intangible intellectual property, unless the firm reserves some 
of its rights by having an assignment and license-back arrangement. See Sheila J. 
McCartney, Licensing Alternatives to Limit Antitrust and Misuse Exposure, 7 J. PROPRIETARY 
RTS. 10,16 (1995) (ili:scussing grant back practice). 
92 See infra notes 139-60. 
93 I.R.C. § 170 (2006); see Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(o), 49 Stat. 
1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by corporations); 
Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (allowing 
charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals). 
94 The government lost an estimated $145 billion in federal revenues from 2001 to 2005 
as a result of the general charitable tax deduction provision. John D. Colombo, The 
Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution Deduction: Integrating Theories for the 
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 657, 658 (2001). The Joint Committee 
on Taxation estimates that total forgone tax revenues from the charitable deduction will be 
$228.5 billion between 2005 and 2009. See Andrew Chamberlain & Mark Sussman, Charities 
and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Federal Income Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts, 
SPECIAL . REPORT (Tax Found., D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 2, ,available at 
http:/ /www.taxfoundation.org/publications/ show /1191.html (follow "Special Report No. 
137" hyperlink). 
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it sees fit. 95 The charitable deduction creates a more diverse, interesting 
society by allowing taxpayers, many of whom are politically powerless, 
to choose and support particular organizations they deem important, 
thereby advancing their own interests.96 By encouraging private 
donations, the charitable deduction provision helps foster a more ethical, 
. ty 97moral soc1e . . 
As originally enacted in 1954, the charitable deduction provision 
contained few limitations. To qualify for a charitable deduction, one had 
to make a money or property contribution to a qualified charity.98 A 
IIcontribution" was interpreted as a "voluntary transfer of money or 
property made with no expectation of procuring a financial benefit 
commensurate with the amount of the transfer."99 Services rendered to a 
charity were not considered property and thus did not qualify .100 The 
Code provided several categories of qualified organizations, including 
11 certain religious, charitable, s9ientific, literary, education" 
organizations. 1 1 If a property contribution was. made to a qualified 
95 See Colombo, supra note 94, at 682 (explaining that timing of amendments to section 
170 charitable deduction provision suggests that government was seeking "voluntary 
transfers from private sector ... to fund needed social programs"); Mark P. Gergen, The 
Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (1988) (explaining 
subsidy theory); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. 
L. REv. 85, 115-16 (1985). 
96 See Joannie Chartg et al., Cross-Border Charitable Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 563, 566 
(1997) (theorizing that charitable contributions should not be taxed, as they "relieve 
governmental burdens"); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property 
and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REv. 1, 7 (2002) (explaining that one advarttage 
of charitable deduction is that it gives donor-taxpayer direct control over donation, rather 
than forcing him to rely on Congress's choice of donee). But see Chamberlain & Sussmart, 
supra note 94, at 1 (questioning which groups should qualify as "charitable organizations" 
for purposes of charitable tax deduction). 
97 See Chang et al., supra note 96, at 567 (citing James J. McGovern, The Exemption 
Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 526 (1976); Edward H. Rabin, Charitable Trusts 
and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 912,920-25 (1966)). · 
98 I.R.C. § 170 (1954). 
99 Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46. Accordingly, if a donor receives a quid pro quo for 
a transfer to a charity, there is no "contribution" and, hence, no charitable deduction 
allowed. 
100 Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(g) (2005). The apparent rationale for disallowing a deduction 
for the rendition of services is the administrative difficulty attendant upon determining the 
fair market value of personal service donations. See, e.g., Hohnes v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 430, 
435 n.3 (1971). As another justification, the value of such services rendered have not been 
taken into account for tax purposes (e.g., included in income). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c) 
(2003). It should be noted that unreimbursed expenses incurred incidental to the rendition 
of such services may, however, constitute a deductible charitable contribution. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-l(g) (2005). 
101 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). Other classifications include: federal, state, or local governmental 
entities; certain war veterans' organizations; domestic fraternal societies, orders, or 
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charitable donee, the amount of the contribution had to be determined. 
The charitable deduction provision, as originally enacted, provided that 
the amount of a taxpayer's charitable contribution was generally the fair 
market value of the property contributed.102 
By granting an immediate deduction equal to the fair market value of 
donated property, the charitable deduction provided an important 
economic incentive for patentees, authors, and artists to donate their 
patents and creative works to further charitable organizations' activities. 
As originally enacted, the charitable deduction regime served as a vital 
tool for the transfer of technology. Large corporations with research and 
development facilities often develop patents that later become 
inconsistent with. their missions or core technologies, that are 
inappropriate for licensing to third parties, or that have no value (for 
defensive purposes) in competitive markets. 103 Thus, the charitable 
deduction provision in . its original form encouraged research 
corporations to donate these "orphan patents" to universities with major 
scientific research programs in which the technologies could be properly 
exploited.104 Research universities and other nonprofit donees were 
given the opportunity to develop potential new technologies, while 
businesses avoided high patent maintenance costs and received a 
charitable tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the donated 
patents. · Dow Chemical, in a prime example of such a technology 
transfer, reportedly donated 10,000 gatents to qualified charitable 
organizations over a five-year period. 1 As intellectual property has 
associations operating under the lodge system; and nonprofit cemetery companies and 
corporations. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (c)(3)-(5). 
102 See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126 ("The fall' market value of an undivided interest 
in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an orgapization described in 
Section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to the 
extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which the property what 
contributed."); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated property to charity was 
allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c) ("If a 
charitable contribution is made in property othe:r; than money, the amount of the 
contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution reduced 
as provided in section 170(e)(1) ....."). 
103 See RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCK, INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., IP DoNATIONS: A 
POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004), available at http:/ /www.iipi.org/reports/IP_Donations 
_Policy _Review.pdf. 
104 The primary patent donors are large corporations with major research and 
development departments, including Dow Chemical, Proctor and Gamble, Boeing, 
Caterpillar, and Eastman Chemical. Id. at 6. The primary patent donees are universities 
that have the remaining capacity to exploit patents. Id. 
los Id. 
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become increasingly valuable and important to the knowledge-based 
economy, the practice of donating intellectual property has flourished. 
Rather than continuing to encourage such donations, however, the 
government has scrutinized intellectual property donations and imposed 
statutory requirements limiting intellectual property donation 
deductions. 
Most recently, Congress . enacted tax legislation in 2004 that 
substantially altered the charitable deduction scheme for intellectual 
· property.106 In particular, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ("2004 
Act") eliminates the fair market value standard and reduces the amount 
a donor can deduct. The new legislation applies to most forms of 
intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, 
trade names, trade secrets and know-how, certain software, and similar 
intellectual property or applications or registrations of such property.107 
For intellectual property contributions made on or after June 3, 2004, 
the 2004 Act limits the charitable deduction amount to the lesser of the 
taxpayer's tax basis in the donated intellectual property or the fair 
market value of the intellectual property at the time of the 
contribution.108 In most cases, wherein intellectual property appreciates 
fu value, the lesser amount is the donor's tax basis. Often, the donor's 
tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many cases, the donor's 
106 On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed into law the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 ("2004 Act"}. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 
1418. The provision is effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004. H.R. REP. No. 
108-548 (2004). The 2004 Act is a hybrid of various versions that had been introduced 
earlier. For earlier versions, see S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 495(b} (2004) (limiting initial 
charitable tax deduction to donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing 
donor to receive from charity up to 50% of any royalties received by charity with respect to 
donated intellectual property); S. 2103, 108th Cong. § l(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable 
tax deduction to donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing fair market 
value ?eduction for "qualified contributions" to "qualified research _organization" (e.g., 
technology gifts to charities that apply their expertise to scientific and commercial 
development)). 
107 H.R. REP. No. 108-548 (2004). The new legislation does not apply to self-created 
copyrights, described in I.R.C. §§ 122l(a)(3), 123l(b)(l}(C) (2002). Section 122l(a)(3) 
excludes from the definition of "capital asset" any copyright held by the creator (taxpayer 
whose personal efforts created the property) or a taxpayer with a basis carried over from 
the creator. Id. § 1221(a}(3). The 2004 Act does not apply to self-created copyrights because 
the 1969 legislation previously eliminated the fair market value standard for self-created 
copyrights. See infra notes 125-27. Furtherii).ore, the new legislation also does not apply to 
off-the-shelf computer software described in I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(A)(I). Namely, the 2004 Act 
does not apply to computer software that: (1) is (or has been) readily available to the 
general public on similar terms, (2) is subject to a nonexclusive license, and (3) has not been 
substantially modified. Id. 
108 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (2006) (as amended by 2004 Act). The new provision applies to 
charitable contributions of intellectual property made after June 3, 2004. HR. REP. 108-548. 
..• 
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basis is zero because intellectual property development costs are often 
deducted when incurred.109 As a result, the 2004 Act reduced or, in many 
cases, eliminated an immediate tax deduction for gifts of intellectual 
property. 
Although the 2004 Act reduces or eliminates the initial charitable 
deduction, it permits a donor to take additional charitable deductions in 
later years based on a certain percentage of the donee's income 
attributable to the intellectual property.110 More specifically, a donor is 
allowed additional deductions for a limited number of years based on a 
specified percentage of the qualified donee income received or accrued 
by the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income 
stemming from the activity in which the donated property is used.111 
"Qualified donee income" is defined specifically as "any net income 
received by or accrued to the donee which is properly allocable to the 
qualified intellectual property."112 For purposes of these future deductions, 
"qualified intellectual property" does not include intellectual property 
donated to a private foundatior\. 113 
The amount of the additional deduction a taxpayer may take each year 
is determined using a sliding-scale percentage of qualified donee income 
109 For example, section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") permits a taxpayer 
to immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures. I.R.C. § 174(a). Research or 
experimental expenditures are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in connection 
with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and development costs in 
the experimental or laboratory sense" and generally include "all costs incident to the 
development or improvement of a product." Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis 
added). Expenditures are incurred in the "experimental or laboratory" sense if they are 
incurred in "activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty 
concerning the development or improvement of a product." Id. The regulations under 
section 174 specifically provide that the costs of obtaining a patent are research and 
experimental expenditures. Id. Such costs include not only expenses incurred in creating 
patentable technology, but also attorneys' fees in the prosecution of patent·applications. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
110 I.R.C. § 170(m)(3). 
111 Id. 
112 ld. (emphasis added). Temporary regulations issued under section 170 do not 
elaborate on this definition of "qualified donee income." Section 170(m)(10)(D)(ii) 
suggests, however, that income arising from the charity's use of the donated property in its 
exempt activities (as opposed to royalties from licensing the property) does not give rise to 
qualified donee income. Id. § 170(m)(lO)(D)(ii). As noted by one commentator: 
"[A]pplying the definition of qualified donee income is likely to prove difficult in many 
circumstances." Kevin Shortill, New Rules for Charities Receiving Certain Contributions of 
Intellectual Property, 2005 EOT 30-14, July 27,2005, at 4. 
113 I.R.C. § 170(m)(9) (stating that additional deductions are not allowed for donations 
to private foundations, other than private operating foundations or certain other 
foundations described in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1}(E)). 
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received or accrued by the charity that is allocable to the proper~. 114 The 
percentage decreases each year, for a period of twelve years. 11 In the 
first and second years after the contribution; a taxpayer can deduct 100% 
of the qualified donee income.116 In year three, a taxpayer can deduct 
90% of the qualified donee income.117 Moreover, in year ten, the taxpayer 
can deduct only 20% of the qualified donee income.118 
In order to· qualify for an additional deduction in a future year, the 
aggregate of the amounts calculated using the sliding-scale must exceed 
the amount of the initial deduction claimed in the year of the 
contribution.119 Additional charitable deductions are not allowed with 
respect to any revenues or income received or accrued by the donee after 
the expiration of the legal life of the intellectual property.120 Additional 
charitable deductions are not available when intellectual property is 
contributed to a private foundation (other than a private operating 
foundation or certain other Code section 170(b)(1)(E) private 
foundations). 121 
· The 2004 Act was intended to curb improper charitable tax deductions 
114 Id. § 170(m)(l), (7). 
115 The amended statute provides that the additional deductions are limited to 12 years 
after the contribution. Id. § 170(m)(lO)(C)-(D). This 12-year limitation seems to be in 
conflict with another rule providing that additional deductions are limited to the legal life 
. of the intellectual property, or ten years after the date of the contribution, whichever occurs 
first. Id. § 170(m) (5)-(6). 
116 Id. § 170(m)(7). 
ut Id. 
118 Id. The following chart shows the actual sliding scale: 
Taxable Year of Donor Ending on or After Applicable Date of Contribution Percentage 

1st...................................................................................................... 100 

2nd..................................................................................................... 100 

3rd ................................................... ~.................................................. 90 

4th.: ...................... ~............................................................................. 80 

5th...................................................................................................... 70 

6th...................................................................................................... 60 

7th .............................................................................................. ;....... 50 

8th ............................................................................................. :........ 40 

9th...................................................................................................... 30 

lOth.................................................................................................... 20 

11th.................................................................. ,................................. 10 

12th.................................................................................................... , . 10 

Id. 

119 Id. § 170(m}(2). 

· 12ll Id. § 170(m)(6). 

121 Id. §§ 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m). 
17492006] Giving Intellectual Property 
resulting ·from overvaluations of donated patents and other forms of 
intellectual property.122 Before enactment of the 2004 Act, the amount of 
a charitable deduction in connection with the donation of many forms of 
intellectual property, such as patents, was equal to the fair market value 
of the intellectual groperty at the time of the contribution, subject to 
certain exceptions.1 The government defined "fair market value" as "the 
price at which the property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."124 The 
government, however, never fully articulated or formaliZed a standard 
or approach for determining the fair market value of donated intellectual 
property. As a consequence, valuation conflicts between donors and the 
government increasingly occurred as intellectual property grew in value 
and the practice of intellectual property donations also grew. 
As valuation abuses became more common, the government began to 
scrutinize intellectual property donations and impose statutory 
requirements limiting intellectual property donation deductions. In its 
first major attack on intellectual property donations, Congress took 
significant measures to curtail the availability of immediate tax benefits 
for contributions of copyrights by creators. Internal Revenue Code 
section 170(e), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, reduced the amount 
of the charitable deduction from fair market value to the creator's basis 
in the copyright (out-of-pocket expenses that had not previously been 
deducted)~125 In many cases, copyright creators have a zero basis in their 
122 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, S. 6457, 108th Cong. 
(2003) (noting "widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar property"); S. 
REP. No. 108-192, at 218 (2003) (noting concern that intellectual property donors "are taking 
advantage of the inherent difficulties in valuing such property and are preparing or 
obtaining erroneous valuations"); see also I.R.S. Commissioner Testimony: Chnritable Giving 
Problems and Best Practices, IRS NEWS RELEASE, June 22, 2004, at 14-15, available at 
http:/ I /www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf ("A key issu~ in intellectual property 
donations, as in all other property donations, is whether the property has been 
appropriately valued. In the case of patent and other intellectual property donations in 
particular, we have concerns about over valuations, whether consideration has been 
received in return, and whether only a partial interest of property is being transferred."). 
123 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
124 Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (2005). 
125 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487,555. The statutory 
mechanics of the 1969 amendment are worth exploring. Section 170(e) applies to 
contributions of certain appreciated property. Id. Whether a reduction in the amount of 
the contribution of appreciated property (from fair market value to cost basis) occurs . 
depends on the character of gain that would be recognized on a hypothetical sale of the 
property by the donor. Id. If the gain on a hypothetical sale by the donor would be 
characterized as long-term capital gain, the amount of the deduction is not reduced (e.g., the 
amount of the donor's contribution is equal to the property's fair market value). Id. If, 
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copyrights, as "qualified creative e~enses" are immediately deductible 
and do not have to be capitalized.1 As a result, the 1969 amendment 
precluded copyright donors from enjoying any immediate financial 
however, the gain on a hypothetical sale would be ordinary income or short-term capital gain, 
the amount of the deduction is reduced by the amount of that lurking ordinary income or 
short-term capital gain. I.R.C..§ 170(e)(l)(A). 
The 1969 amendment affected the deduction of copyright donations by copyright 
creators, because artistic and other copyrighted works produced by donors are excluded 
from the definition of "capital asset" and, if sold, produce ordinary income. Id. § 1231(a)(3), 
(b)(1)(C). The definitions of "capital asset" and "section 1231 property" both exclude a 
"copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar 
property" in the hands of the person who created them (or in the possession of a person 
who received the property as a gift from the person who created it). Id. Accordingly, 
capital gains treatment is not available to the creator of a copyright, literary, musical, or· 
artistic composition or similar property, nor is it available to any person who acquires such 
property by gift. Id. The regulations provide: 
[P].roperty is created in whole or in part by the personal efforts of a taxpayer if 
such taxpayer performs literary, theatrical, musical, artistic, or other creative or 
productive work which affirmatively contributes to the creation of the property, 
or if such taxpayer directs and guides others in the performance of such work 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.1221-1(c)(3). 
Under thls system, the amount o{ the charitable deduction for such copyright 
creators is the copyright's fair market value minus the amount of such ordinary income that 
would be reported by the donor on the sale of the copyright. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-172, §20l(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, 549 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§170(e)(1)(A)). The amount of ordinary income from a hypothetical sale is equal to the 
property's fair market value minus the cost basis in the work (e.g., out-of-pocket expenses 
in creating the work to the extent they were not deducted when incurred). See id. at 555. 
Most copyright creators have a zero basis in their creations, as qualified creative expenses 
are immediately deductible and do not have to be capitalized. See infra note 126. Hence, the 
amount of the charitable deduction for a copyright creator is often reduced by the full fair 
market value, producing no deduction for the creator. 
126 For example, the creation costs incurred by certain authors and artists in producing 
manuscripts and works of art are deductible. Code section Z63A(h} provides an important, 
but narrow, exemption from the capitalization requirements of section 263A in the case of 
certain writers, photographers, and artists. l.R.C. § 263A(h). Added to the Code in 1988, 
section 263A(h) provides that "qualified creative expenses" are not required to be 
capitalized. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 531 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 145 
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5205 (noting purpose of exemption was to 
relieve writers, photographers, and artists from burden of uniform capitalization rules, 
especially when activities may not generate income for years). A "qualified creative 
expense" is any expense paid or incurred by an individual in the trade or business of being 
a "writer," "photographer," or "artist," which, except for the uniform capitalization rules of 
section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 263A(h)(2). If 
the exemption provision of section 263A(h) applies, qualified creative expenses of 
producing copyrightable works are not subject to the uniform capitalization rules of section 
263A and may be deductible if the elements of section 162 are satisfied. If deducted in full, 
then the basis in the work of art would be .zero. 
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benefit from their charitable donations. 127 
The 1969 amendment, in contrast, had little impact on patent 
donations.128 A patent donor who transferred all substantial rights in the 
patent would generally get a deduction equal to the full fair market 
value of the patent.129 By retaining a fair market value deduction for 
127 The 1969 Act also limited the amount of a taxpayer's deduction to his or her tax 
basis if the property is tangible, personal property and the charity's use of the property is 
unrelated to its charitable purpose or function or if the property is contributed to or for the 
use of a private foundation. I.R.C. § 170(e)(B)(i)-(ii). There are exceptions, however. See, 
e.g., id. § 170(e)(3)-(4), (6). 
128 As explained below, whether a taxpayer donating a patent to a charity was eligible 
for a charitable deduction equal to the patent's fair market value (or whether the 
contribution had to be reduced by the amount of built-in-gain in the ·patent) depended on a 
number of factors, including whether the donor was an individual and whether the donor 
had transferred "all substantial rights" in the patent. See infra note 129. 
129 This is ·because if the individual donor had sold the patent, the gain would be 
treated as long-term capital gain under the special characterization provision applicable to 
patents. I.R.C. § 1235(a). Section 1235 provides long-term capital gain treatment for 
transfers of all substantial rights to patents by individuals and applies only if the transferor 
is a statutorily defined "holder" of the patent. Id. The "holder" of a patent is defined as; 
(1) any individual whose personal efforts created the patent property; or (2) any other 
individual - other than the employer or relative of the inventor - who acquired his 
interest in the patent property from the original inventor in exchange for money, or 
money's worth, prior to the actual reduction to practice of the invention covered by the 
patent ("financial backer"). ld. § 1235(b). 
. . Section 1235 only applies to a transfer "of all the substantial rights" to a patent or an 
"undivided interest" therein. ld. § 1235(a). The term "all substantial rights" refers to all 
rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to 
the patent (or an undivided interest in it) are transferred. Treas. ·Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1). 
Therefore, to qualify for the. benefits under section 1235, a transferor must typically transfer 
the entire bundle of rights under a patent (e.g., convey the exclusive right to make, use, and 
sell the patent in all geographical regions and in all fields of use). Whether or not all 
substantial rights to a patent are ·considered to have been transferred in a transaction 
depends upon the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction and not the particular . 
terminology used in the transfer instrument. ld. 
Section 1235 applies only to patents and not to. other forms of intellectual property 
such as copyrights, trademarks, or know-how. I.R.C. § 1235(a). Although the Code does 
not define a "patent" for purposes of section 1235, the regulations provide that the term 
"patent" means a patent granted under the provisions of Title 35 of the U.S. Code, as well 
as any foreign patent granting rights generally similar to those under a U.S. patent. Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.1235-2(a). The regulations under section 1235 also provide that it is not necessary 
that the patent or patent application for the invention be in existence if the requirements of 
section 1235 are otherwise met. ld. Thus, section 1235 can apply to patentable technology 
for which a formal patent application has not yet been made. See id. 
· Because section 1235 would provide long-term capital gain treatment on the sale of a 
donated patent, the individual donor is entitled to a full fair market value charitable 
deduction. See id. This is so regardless of whether the donor is a professional inventor or 
dealer, no matter how long the donor held the patent, and whether or not a patent or 
patent application exists at the time of gift. See id. However, if a patent donor is not an 
individual (e.g., is a corporation, partnership, or trust), the amount of the charitable 
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patent donations, but not for copyright donations, patent donations 
continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1969 amendment.130 In the 
late 1990s, patents became increasingly valuable assets and important to 
the knowledge-based economy . 131 The fair market value standard 
appealed to the new breed of donors who approached philanthropy with 
venture capitalist principles, seeking maximum financial return from 
their giving. 132 
The fair market value standard, however, also spawned valuation 
abuses by patent donors.133 In 2003, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
announced its intent to scrutinize questionable deductions of intellectual 
property contributions and to enforce requirements and limitations on 
patent donation deductions.134 The plan, released in Notice 2004-7, 
contribution deduction depends on the character of gain that would result on a 
hypothetical sale of the donated patent because section 1235 does not apply to 
corporations, partnerships, and trusts. Id. The Code provides general characterization 
provisions to determine whether the built-in gain is ordinary income, short-term capital 
gain, or long-term capital gain. I.R.C. §§ 1221-1222, 1231. For the hypothetical sale of a 
patent outside the scope of section 1235 to qualify for capital gains treatment, the patent 
must qualify as a capital asset under section 1221 or as a quasi-capital asset under section 
1231 and must have been held for more than one year. See id. 
130 For patent donation activity prior to the 2004 Act, see supra notes 103-05 and 
accompanying text. Whether a donor is the creator or a collector should be irrelevant in 
determining the charitable deduction amount. There is no good reason why an art 
collector/investor is entitled to a full fair market value deduction, while an artist is entitled 
to deduct only his basis in the property (the cost of the brushes, canvases, pencils, or paper 
to the extent not previously deducted). As one notable artist stated: "If anyone else buys 
my painting for $2, he can then 'give it to a museum and deduct $10,000 from his taxes, if 
that is the market value of the piece. If I myself donate it, I get $2 tax credit, because that is 
what the paint and canvas cost." Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Artists, Collectors, 
and Private Foundation Status, 103 TAX NOTES 195, 195 n.1 (2004) (quoting artist Ettore De 
Grazia, who gained notoriety after he burned over 100 of his oil paintings at Angel Spring 
in Superstition Mountains east of Phoenix over frustration with tax treatment of successful 
artists). . 
131 See supra notes 21-24, 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing increasing 
importance and value of patents). 
132 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
133 See, e.g., Smith v. Comrn'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981) (concluding that value of 
donated patent was $3500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction in excess of 
$200,000). For government concerns about overvaluations, see supra note 125 and 
accompanying text. 
134 The Commissioner of the IRS stated in a news release: 
[I]t is important for taxpayers considering donations of patents or other 
intellectual property to focus on the limitations of the deductions . . . . We're 
seeing an increasing number of deductions that don't pass the smell test. 
Donations that are overly inflated or made with strings attached are going to. 
receive increased scrutiny. 
Treasury Issue Notice Regarding Improper Deductions for Clulritable Contributions of Patents and 
2006] Giving Intellectual Property 1753 
included a multipronged attack on donors, promoters, and appraisers. 
Notice 2004-7 stated that "some taxpayers that transfer patents or other 
intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming charitable 
deductions in excess of the amounts to which they are entitled" and 
warned that "the Service intends to disallow improper charitable 
deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of 
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations."135 
· Although the Notice announced the government's enforcement 
campaign against and planned attack on donors, promoters, and 
appraisers, it provided little guidance on the proper method of 
computing a patent's fair market value. According to the Notice, "the 
fair market value of a patent .must be determined after taking into 
account" factors including: "(1) whether the patented technology has 
been made obsolete by other technology; (2) any restrictions on the 
donee's use of, or ability to transfer, the patented technology; and (3) the 
length of time remaining before the patent's expiration:"136 
Unfortunately, the IRS's enforcement campaign regarding intellectual 
property donations, announced in 2003, never got off the ground. It was 
rendered moot when, less than a year later in the 2004 Act, Congress 
hastily eliminated the fair market value standard for contributions of 
most forms of intellectual property.137 By eliminating the, fair market 
value standard, the 2004 Act reduces the number of negligent and 
intentional overvaluations of intellectual property donations and, 
correspondingly, reduces the. administrative costs and burdens 
associated with overvaluations of donated intellectual property. In 
addition, the 2004 Act is expected to generate hundreds of millions of 
other Intellectual Property, IRS NEWS RELEASE, Dec. 22, 2003, at 1, available at 
http: I /www.irs.govI newsroom/article/O,id=118864,00.html. · 
135 I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 sets forth the following four 
situations arising out of intellectual property transfers to charitable organizations that will 
be closely scrutinized: (1) the transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual 
property, (2) the donor's expectation or receipt of a benefit in exchange for the contribution, 
(3) inadequate substantiation of the contribution, and (4) overvaluation of the intellectual 
property being transferred. Id. In addition to its warning to taxpayers, the Notice also 
sends a warning to promoters and appraisers that certain behavior will no longer be 
tolerated. Id. It states that the IRS will review promotions and appraisals of intellectual 
property when it scrutinizes suspect donations. Id. If the IRS identifies a situation in which . 
a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer, promoter, and 
· appraiser may all be subject to penalties. Id; see I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (penalty provision 
applicable to taxpayers); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 (penalty provisions applicable to appraisers 
and promoters). 
136 I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. 

137 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text for a summary of the 2004 Act. 
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dollars in additional federal revenue each year.138 However, the greater 
policy issue, one that has been overlooked by Congress, is whether it 
adequately incentivizes socially desirable intellectual property donations 
to further charitable goals: 
A. Advantages of System Based on Immediate Economic Incentives 
A fair market va1ue measuring rod for charitable deductions allows 
donors to enjoy an immediate tax benefit equal to the fair market value 
of donated intellectual property, even though such donors are not 
required to report in their income the difference between the fair market 
value of the donated intellectual property and the original out-of-pocket 
costs or unrecovered basis in them.139 By eliminating any immediate 
financial benefits for intellectual property contributions, the 2004 Act 
will have a dramatic impact on in-kind donations of intellectual property 
not targeted by the 1969 Act (e.g., donations of self-created copyrights).140 
Indeed, it has been predicted that the charitable deduction system will 
' no longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool. Potential patent 
donors, for instance, will undoubtedly opt to abandon their inventions 
under the new law rather than contribute them to charities, as was 
138 An earlier version of the 2004 Act, which limited the initial deduction to the donor's 
tax basis, was expected to raise $385 million per year. See Brenda Sandburg, IRS Tweaks 
Rules for Patent Donations (Jan. 1, 2004); available at http:/ /www.ljnonline.com/pub/ 
ljn_patent/4_9/news/141878-l.html (describing impact of S. 1637). The government 
savings are a bit misleading, however. If private charitable giving declb:i.es as a result of 
the 2004 Act, the government will need to provide increased direct subsidies to charities in 
response . 
. 
139 Under the prior law, it seems that owners could donate their intellectual property 
"inventories" and enjoy incredible tax advantages by attempting to wipe out a substantial 
amount of income by donating a sufficiently large portion of their intellectual property 
holdings. Currently, however, the Code impose~ various ceilings on the total amount that 
a donor may deduct in any given year. I.R.C. § 170(b}. For example, donations made by 
individuals directly to public charities are deductible to the extent that such contributions 
do not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(F). 
Donations made in trust for public charities or for the use of private charities are generally 
subject to a general limitation of 30% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the year. 
Id. § 170(b)(l)(B)(i). For ceilings on gifts of appreciated capital gain property, see id. § 
170(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(l)(D)(i). ·Contributions in excess of any of these ceilings are permitted to 
be carried over to the five succeeding years. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (b)(l)(C), (b)(1)(D)(ii}, (d)(l). 
' 
40 The 2004 Ad does not affect donations of copyrights by their creators, as those 
donations were targeting by the 1969 legislation. See supra note 125. As noted above, the 
1969 Act reduced the amount of a charitable deduction for copyright donors from fair 
market value to tax basis in the donated copyright. See supra notes 125-27 and 
accompanying text. The 2004 Act achieves horizontal equity by treating copyright donors 
and patent donors the same. This Article argues, however, that the 2004. Act went in the 
wrong direction in achieving horizontal equity. 
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common under the old law. As one commentator predicted: "80-90% of 
the brainpower of the U.S. will be left on corporate shelves."141 
According to the Intellectual Property Owners Association, eliminating a 
fair market value deduction will "effectively end the opportunity for 
academic and scientific professionals at nonprofit research institutions 
and universities to develop valuable technologies acquired through 
patent donations from U.S. companies for which the technology is no 
longer a part of their strategic business plans.''142 
The predicted decline in in-kind charitable giving of intellectual 
property, particularly patents, will most likely prove accurate when one 
considers the dramatic impact that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had on 
copyright donations by copyright creators. As discussed above, the 1969 
Act eliminated the fair market value approach for donations of 
copyrights by copyright creators.143 After the amendment, far fewer gifts 
were made by writers, artists, and photographers to museums, libraries, 
universities, and other charitable organizations.144 Libraries and 
museums, in particular, reported significant reductions in and, in some 
cases, complete losses of gifts from noted authors, composers, and 
artists. The Museum of Modem Art in New York, for example, 
reportedly received 321 gifts from artists in the three years prior to the 
1969 amendment, but only twenty-eight gifts from artists in the three 
years following the amendment- a 90% decrease.145 Another account 
shows that the Museum of Modem Art received forty-seven gifts from 
artists in the year 1969, but only one gift in the two years following the 
1969 amendrnent.146 The Library of Congress, which annually received 
fifteen to twenty large gifts of manuscripts from authors prior to 1969, 
received only one gift in the four years after the 1969 amendment.147 
141 See LAYTON & BLOCH, supra note 103, at 6. 
142 CCH, AMERICAN JOBS CREATION Acr OF 2004: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 432 
(2004) (quoting association's comments regarding earlier, similar version of bill). 
143 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
144 For the effect of the 1969 Act, see Douglas J. Bell, Changing I.R.C. § 170(E)(1)(A): For 
Art's Sake, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 536, 547 (1987); William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations 
of Intellectual Property: The case for Retaining the Fair Market Value Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. 
REv. 1045, 1127 (2004) (providing chart showing decline in copyright donations by 
copyright creators); Pamela J. Lajeunesse, Tax Incentives for Support of the Arts: In Defense of 
the Ch{lritable Deduction, 85 DICK. L. REV. 663, 668 n.27 (1981); Larry D. McBennett et al., Art 
Update: Tax Deductions for Self-Created Works of Art, 30 FED. B. NEWs & J. 342, 342-43 {1983). 
1~5 S. 1889, 108th Cong. (2003} (imparting Senator Patrick Leahy's statements 
introducing Artist-Museum Partnership Act of 2003); see also ACF Newsource, Artists' Gift, 
www.acfnewsource.org/art/artists__gift.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). 
146 See Lajeunesse, supra note 144, at 668 n.27. . . 
147 See S. 1889; see also The "Community Solutions Act of 2001 ": Joint Hearing Bejore the 
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More strikingly, whereas the Library of Congress annually received a 
total of 230 self-created musical manuscripts and 179,000 self-created 
literary manuscripts before 1969, it ·received none in the two years 
following the 1969 amendment. 148 Many of the musicians and artists who 
planned to date their papers and artworks to the Library of Congress 
instead sold them after the 1969 amendment.149 
Under the 2004 Act, for a charity to obtain ownership of intellectual 
property and for a donor to receive any immediate tax benefit, the 
intellectual property owner would have to sell the intellectual property 
to a third party, pay a tax on resulting gains, and then contribute the 
after-tax cash to the charitable organization. The charity, in turn, would 
have to use the donated cash to attempt to purchase the intellectual 
property from the third party purchaser. Most intellectual property 
owners and charities would not engage in such maneuvering; the related 
transactional costs and the risk that the charity may not be able to obtain 
the intellectual property upon acceptable terms and conditions would be 
too high in most cases. Moreover, as noted by one commentator, 
corporate inventors would not have an incentive to sell their patents and 
contribute after-tax cash because corporations pay federal income tax at 
the same rate on long-term capital gains and ordinary income.150 
Companies only have an incentive to make an in-kind donation of a 
patent rather than sell the patent and donate the after-tax proceeds.151 
Although the new legislation has eliminated an immediate deduction 
for charitable intellectual property contributions, it does permit donors 
to take future deductions if the donated intellectual property generate~ 
income to the charitable donee.152 The government presumably believes 
that a charitable contribution system solely providing donors with 
uncertain, declining, future economic incentives will adequately 
encourage intellectual property donations. But this premise is flawed. 
Even if a charitable donee licenses donated intellectual property, the 
potential future deduction will not' be substantial. First, it may take a 
Subcomm. on Human Res. & Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 107th Cong. 190-91 (2001) 
(statement for the record of Assoc. of Art Museum Dirs.) [hereinafter Assoc. of Art 
Museum Dirs. Statement]; ACF Newsource, supra note 145. 
148 See Lajeunesse, supra note 144, at 668 n.27. 
149 See McBenn~tt et al., supra note 144, at 342-43 (discussing music composer Igor 
Stravinsky who sold papers to private foundation in Switzerland instead of donating them 
to Music Division ofLibrary of Congress); see also S. 1889; ACF Newsource, supra note 145; 
Assoc. of Art Museum Dirs. Statement, supra note 147 . 
. 
150 See Drennan, supra note 144, at 1082-83. 
· 1s1· Id. 
152 See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text. 
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charity several years before it receives any financial return on donated 
intellectual property. As the intellectual property begins to gen~rate 
increasing royalty revenues, however, the amount of the charitable 
deduction under the 2004 Act declines by use of a sliding-scale 
percentage (the percentage decreases each year for a limited time 
period). Indeed, in the tenth post-contribution year, the donor may 
deduct only 20% of the income generated by the intellectual property . 
. As no~ed by one commentator: "That's really not any great incentive for 
a corporation to spend its time digging through its patents."153 
The 2004 Act is inconsistent with the government's historical approach 
of encouraging economic and socially desirable behavior through 
immediate tax benefits. As the government is well aware, what 
incentiv~es behavior is a system of immediate economic benefits rather 
than a system of speculative future benefits under an accrual approach. 
Indeed, tax law is replete with instances in which ta~ayers are given 
immediate tax breaks to encourage desirable behavior.1 For example, to 
encourage innovation, Code section 174 permits a taxpayer to 
immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures when they 
are incurred, rather than deduct such costs over the useful life or legally 
protected life of the resulting patent.155 Providing an immediate tax 
deduction for desirable research and development is clearly inconsistent 
with the government's ;oal of matching income and the expenses that 
. produced the income.1 Nevertheless, immediate economic incentives 
are seen as necessary means to achieve a competing, higher policy end: 
153 See Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at Stopping Abuses, 102 TAX 
NOTES 699,700 (2004). 
lSI See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198 (2005) (providing special expenditure of envirorunental 
remediation costs); I.R.C. § 174 (2004) (providing immediate deduction for research and 
experimental expenditures); id. § 179 (proyiding election to expense certain depreciable 
business assets); id. § 179A (providing deduction for clean-fuel vehicles and certain 
refueling property); id. § 1798 (providing deduction for capital costs incurred in complying 
with Environmental Protection Agency sulfur regulations); id. § 181 (providing special 
treatment for certain qualified film and television_ production expenses); id. § 190 
(providing special treatment for expenditures to remove architectural· and transportation 
barriers to handicapped and elderly). 
155 See supra note 8. 
156 The goverriment has enacted various capitalization and cost recovery rules to 
achieve a fair allocation of the costs of creating or acquiring an asset to the period in which 
the taxpayer realizes income from the asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2006) (requiring 
capitali;z;ation of certain creation and acquisition costs); id. §§ 167, 1(i8, 197 (permitting 
depreciation or amortization deductions for capitalized costs); see also Comm'r v. Idaho 
Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose of cost recovery system). In 
addition, the government has provided several exceptions for certain creation and 
acquisition expenditures. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 174. 
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to encourage the development of new technologies to drive economic 
growth. 
To further illustrate, many costs incurred in the development of 
computer software do not satisfy the definition of research and 
experimental exrenditures under section 174 and would seemingly be 
nondeductible.15 Nevertheless, to encourage computer software 
development, the government permits software developers to 
immediately deduct the costs of developing computer software, whether 
the software is patented or copyrighted.158 Interestingly, the government 
has chosen to adopt a broad definition of "computer software" to 
. . . 159 
encourage so ftware deve opmen t ac1 tiv1ties. 
157 M~y costs. incurred in computer software development are not experimental or 
investigative in a laboratory sense and fail to satisfy the uncertainty test under section 174. 
For example, the costs of developing routine accounting, management information, billing, 
or payroll systems involve no uncertainty with respect to the software design or capability. 
Hence, these costs would not qualify as section 174 research and experimental 
expenditures. See I.R.C. § 174. Likewise, costs to produce documentation for maintaining 
and describing computer software would not qualify. 
158 
·Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.B. 601. This revenue procedure updated the IRS's 
prior pronouncement on the deductibility of computer software costs, Rev. Proc. 69-21, 
1969-2 C.B. 303, by integrating changes resulting from the 1993 enactment of sections 167(f) 
and 197 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. For example, the definition of "computer 
software" under Revenue Procedure 2000-50 follows the definition given in section 197. 
I.R.C. § 197. Before the IRS superseded Revenue Procedure 69-21 with Revenue Procedure 
2000-50, it twice issued Proposed Regulations governing computer software development 
costs. In 1983, the IRS issued Proposed Regulations that would have permitted computer 
software development costs to be deductible under section 174 only if they were paid or 
incurred in developmg "new or significantly improved computer software." Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.174-2{a)(xi)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 2799 Gan. 21, 1983). This determination would be 
made with respect to the computer program itself rather than the end use of the program. 
Id. These Proposed Regulations were withdrawn the same year. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 
38,996 Gune 8, 1983); I.R.S. News Release IR-83-71 (Apr. 19, 1983). Furthermore, in 1989, 
the IRS issued revised Proposed Regulations under section 174, which softened the 1983 
Proposed Regulations's harsh "new or significantly improved" standard, focusing instead 
on whether the product met its basic design specifications related to function and 
performance level. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(6), 54 Fed. Reg. 45154, 45165 (Oct. 30, 
1989). In 1993, these regulations were withdrawn, .and the IRS announced that it would 
continue to apply its position in Revenue Procedure 69-21. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 174(e), 58 
Fed. Reg. 15819-15820 (Mar. 24, 1993). Revenue Procedure 69-21 was thus the governing 
standard until the IRS pronounced Revenue Procedure 2000-50. 
159 This definition provides: 
For the purpose of this revenue procedure, 'computer software' is any program 
or routine (that is, any sequence of machine-readable code) that is designed to 
cause a computer to perform a desired function or set of functions, and the 
documentation required to describe and maintain that program or routine. It 
includes aU forms and media in which the software is contained, whether 
written, magnetic, or otherwise. Computer programs of all classes, for example, 
operating systems, executive systems; monitors, compilers and trarlSlators, 
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With respect to these examples (patent and software development), 
the government recognizes that finan~ial incentives, provided to 
taxpayers with certainty and immediacy, are more effective than 
financial incentives provided on an uncertain, delayed basis. Therefore,· 
to achieve optimal inventive and development activities, the government 
has adopted a system of iinm.ediate economic incentives. Ironically, with 
the 2004 Act, the . government has taken an inconsistent approach 1n 
achieving the dissemination of innovation for social good. 
·Although the 2004 Act eliminated any immediate economic incentive 
. for inventors to donate their patents by providing donors with only 
uncertain future benefits in return for their donations, it has kept in place 
an immediate economic incentive for outright cash gifts and most real 
estate gifts. Such retention is perhaps a result of the failure to 
acknowledge the significant shift in the level of importance. from 
tangible, physical property to intangible property. It is a general 
reflection of the "legal and business uncertainty" associated with 
intangibles, as noted by Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board. According to Greenspan: 
[T]his uncertainty derives from the fact that intellectual property is 
importantly different from physical property. Because they have a 
material existence, physical assets are more capable of being 
defended by police, the militia, or private mercenaries. By contrast, 
intellectual property can be stolen by an act as simple as 
broadcasting an idea without the permission of· the originator. 
Moreover, one individual's use of an idea does not make that idea 
assembly routines, and utility programs as well as application programs, are 
included. Computer software also includes any incidental and ancillary rights 
that are necessary to effect the acquisition of the title to, the ownership of, or the 
right to use the computer software, and that are used only in connection with 
that specific computer software. Computer software does not include any data 
or information base described in§ 1.197-2(b)(4} of the Income Tax Regulations, 
(for example, data files, customer lists, or client files} unless the data base or item 
is in the public domain, and is incidental to a computer program. Nor does it 
indude any cost of procedures that are external to the computer's operation. 
Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.B. 601. 
Because the government defined "computer software" so broadly, Revenue 
Procedure 2000-50 applies not only to software development costs that would otherwise 
constitute "research and ·experimental expenditures" under section 174, but, more 
importantly, also to software development costs that do not satisfy the definition of 
"research and experimental expenditures" under section 174. See id. Thus, Revenue 
Procedure 2000-50 may permit the immediate deduction of computer software 
development costs, even where section 174 does not apply. 
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unavailable to others for their own simultaneous use.160 
As intangible property has gained importance in the modem economy 
and society, new legislation must respond accordingly. 
B. Disadvantages of a System Based Solely on Future Economic Incentives 
The current charitable deduction regime for intellectual property, 
based solely on speculative, future economic incentives, raises several 
policy concerns. Although the new law has attempted to achieve 
horizontal equity by treating patent and copyright donors alike,161 it also 
favors income-generating intellectual property over property that does 
not produce income. The new law essentially separates intellectual 
property donations into two groups: money-making and non-money­
making.162 The inherent implication from such a dichotomy is that the 
intellectual property that is used for fundamental or purely scientific 
research is not as valuable as the intellectual property that is used in 
applied research.163 Applied research often leads to commercialization, 
160 Greenspan, supra note 37. 
161 Horizontal equity is the principle that persons in like circumstances should be taxed 
equally. See, e.g., JOESPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND 
POUCY 55, 88 (1989) ("[W]e can postulate a kind of bedrock notion of tax fairness, called 
horizontal equity, which yields the following maxim: like-situated taxpayers should be 
taxed the same. It's hard to disagree with that."); LlAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE 
MYrH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 13 (2002) ("[H]orizontal equity is what fairness 
demands in the treatment of people at same levels."). 
162 For an example of this dualism in the copyright context, consider the copyright in 
J.K. Row ling's Harry Potter & the Half-Blood Prince and the copyrights in Alan Dershowitz's 
papers. The new law values the copyright in the former over the latter due to the former's 
direct income-generating capability. The new law ignores the nonmonetary value in Alan 
Dershowitz's papers, which were recently donated to Brooklyn College. See Brooklyn 
College, Alan Dershowitz Donates His . Papers to Brooklyn College, 
http:/ /www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/bc/spotlite/news/090503.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) 
(reporting Alan Dershowitz's donation to Brooklyn College). -Researchers and students can 
use and rely on such papers for their investigation, research, and studies. Such activities 
resulting from the papers donated to Brooklyn College have tremendous positive impact 
on communities and societies. See id. ("The Dershowitz papers are a tremendous addition 
to the Brooklyn College Library and will attract researchers and scholars for years to 
come."). 
163 
"Basic (aka fundamental or pure) research is driven by a scientist's curiosity or interest 
in a scientific question.". Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Basic Research? Webpage, 
http: I /www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/FramesI research-basic-defined-f.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter What Is Basic Research?]. "Applied research is designed to solve 
practical problems of the modem world, rather than to aqcquire [sic] knowledge for 
knowledge's sake." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Applied Research? Webpage, 
http:/ /www.lbl.gov /Education/ELSI/Frames/research-applied-defined-f.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2006). The dichotomy of basic versus applied research has been a subject of 
controversial debate. Questions relating to the purpose of each type of research, the lack of · 
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whereas the main motivation for fundamental or pure research is the 
advancement of knowledge.164 Favoring one type of intellectual property 
over another based solely on its capability for generating money shows 
that the government fails to comprehend that both types of intellectual 
property are important. 
[M]ost scientists believe that a basic, fundamental understanding of 
all branches of science is needed in order for progress to take place. 
In other words, basic research lays the foundation for the applied 
science that follows. If basic work is done first, then applied spin­
offs. often eventually result from this research. 1~ 
Moreover, the new law favors commercially-driven donees over other 
donees. The commercially-driven donees are those that can use the 
intellectual property in ways that will directly generate income. The 
troublesome implication . from such favoritism is that donees. that 
emphasize education and basic research are not as worthy as the 
commercially-driven donees because their utilization of the donated· 
·intellectual property will not directly generate income. This favoritism 
also rewards donees that are endowed with the physical facilities, 
financial resources, and personnel capability to exploit intellectually 
property solely for direct financial results.166 In other words, the new law 
favors the "have-donees" over the "have-not donees." This may serve to 
create and perpetuate the imbalance between the two groups of donees 
for intellectual property donations. 
Ultimately, the new law places the burden on donors to search for 
funding availability for basic research, and the growth of industry funding to finance 
applied research are at the heart of the debate. See Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Basic v. 
Applied Research Webpage, http:/ /www.lbl.gov /Education/ELSI/research-main.html 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006). . 
164 On the other hand, basic ,research has "no obvious commercial value to the 
discoveries that result from basic research" because the main motivation is "to expand man's 
knowledge." What Is Basic Research?, supra note 163. 
165 Id. ("People cannot foresee the future well enough to predict what's going to 
develop from basic research. If we only did applied research, we would still be making 
better spears."). Other commentators such as C.H. Llewellyn Smith, former Director­
General of CERN have argued that "governments have a special responsibility to fund 
basic science while applied science can generally be left to industry." C.H. Llewellyn 
Smith, What's the Use of Basic Science?, http:/ /public:web.cem.ch/public/Content/ 
Chapters/ AboutCERN /WhatisCERN /BasicScience/BasicScience2/BasicScience2-en.html 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006). 
166 Moreover, universities that have the facilities and resources still devote much of 
their efforts to many valuable "innovations that fail to generate substantial income returns 
but nevertheless advance the greater public good and are therefore commensurate with. 
university missions." BethLynn Maxwell et al., Overview of Licensing Technology from 
Universities; 762 PLI/PAT 507,513-14 (2004). 
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donees capable of utilizing the intellectual property for the direct 
production of income. Donors must conduct their own research and due 
diligence to determine, with a high degree of certainty, whether a 
particular donee will use the intellectual property donation directly to 
yield monetary results. The new law assumes that all intellectual 
property donations have inherent earning potential that can be 
translated into immediate income for the donees. However, this 
assumption is false because many intellectual property donations ·are 
orphan and have very little immediate commercial value.167 If these 
intellectual properties are commercially valuable, the donors would keep 
and use the intellectual property for their own benefit.168 After all, the 
creators and owners of these intellectual properties are often more 
capable of exploiting the intellectual property than the potential donees 
are. 
169 Furthermore, donors_ could have sold a valuable piece of 
intellectual property and given the money or part of it to donees, rather 
than make a charitable donation. 
It is bad policy to create tax law that favors money-generating 
intellectual property donations over non-money-generating intellectual 
property donations, as both types of donations contribute to society as a 
whole. The increased burden placed on donors to find commercially­
driven donees is unwise, and many potential donors may choose to 
allow these intellectual properties to die out at the expiration of the legal 
protection term instead. Researchers, investigators, students, and society 
as a whole will suffer the loss because the tax system fails to encourage 
the dissemination of orphan intellectual property. 
In addition, the new law's sole focus on future economic benefits 
167 Moreover, most non-orphan patents owned by universities do not directly generate 
much income. Kapczynski, supra note 69, at 1088 (stating that university technology 
offices' management of patents "tend to remain money-losing endeavors"). Kapczynski 
further observes: 
The number of schools that make money from technology transfer is small~ and 
those that profit tend to do so from a limited number of highly successful 
patents. Licensing revenues are typically equivalent to just 4% of a uiuversity's 
research funds, and this figure decreases sigirlficaritly when the costs of patent 
and license management, as well as the inventors'.share of royalty income, are 
subtracted. When patent royalties are compared to total university revenue, they 
appear quite small, constituting only 0.5 to 2% of revenues, even for the subset of 
universities that are patent-productive. · · 
Id. 
168 See Burk, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that firms, a.S holders of intellectual property 
assets, possess knowledge and capability to coordinate development and exploit 
proprietary rights). 
169 Id. 
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imposes heavy administrative burdens, including modified and 
expanded record-keeping requirements, on both intellectual property 
donors and charitable donees. Because the new law allows donors to 
take deductions over a period of years that will be determined based on 
the income derived from the donated property, the donor and the donee 
organization must communicate with one another and the IRS for several 
years following a qualified contribution. The 2004 Act requires donors to 
inform charitable donees of their intent to treat the contribution as a 
"qualified intellectual property contribution" and take additional 
charitable deductions in subsequent years based on the income accrued 
from the donated property.170 In tum, the 2004 Act requires charitable 
donees to provide donors with written substantiations explaining the 
amount of income derived from the donated intellectual property during 
the taxable year.171 Furthermore, charitable donees must file an annual 
information return re~orting their qualified donee income and other 
specified information.1 2 · 
170 I.R.C. § 170(m)(8)(B) (2004) (as amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004); 
H.R. REP. No. 108-755, § 882 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341. In May 2005, the 
IRS released new guidelines concerning the notification requirements that donors must . 
follow to claim additional deductions for contributions of qualified intellectual property. 
I.R.S. Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1. Under Notice 2005-41, donors of qualified 
intellectual property must deliver to the charitable donee, at the time of donation, a written 
statement containing: (1) the name, address, and taxpayer information of the donor; (2) a 
description of the qualified intellectual property in enough detail that it can be identified 
by the donee; (3) the date of the charitable contribution; and (4) a statement saying that the 
donor intends to treat the contribution as a qualified intellectual property contribution 
under section 170(m) and section 6050L. Id. The IRS has asked for public comment on 
Notice 2005-41. See Comment Request for Notice 2005-41, 70 Fed. Reg. 32706 (June 3, 2005). 
171 I.R.C. § 6050L(b). 
172 Id. ("[E]ach donee with respect to a qualified intellectual property contribution shall 
make a return ... with respect to each specified taxable year of the donee showing (A) the 
name, address, and TIN of th~; donor, (B) adescription of the qualified intellectual property 
contributed, (C) the date of the contribution, and (D) the amount of net income of the donee 
for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual property"). In 
May 2005, the IRS published proposed regulations, simultaneously released as temporary 
regulations, which provide guidance for the filing of information returns by recipients of 
qualified intellectual property contributions. See Information Returns by Donees Relating . 
to Qualified Intellectual Property Contributions, 70 Fed. Reg. 29 460, (May 23, 2005) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed regulations); T.D. 9206, 70 Fed. Reg. 29450-01 (May 23, 
2005) (temporary regulations). The regulations, effective May 23, 2005, affect charitable 
donees receiving net income from qualified intellectual property contributions made after 
June 3, 2004. Under the regulations, a charitable donee is required to file an information 
return any taxable year of the donee that includes any portion of the 10-year period 
beginning on the date of the contribution, but not for taxable years after the expiration of 
the legal life of the qualified intellectual property; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050L.:2T(a) 
· (2005). The return must be filed on or before the last day of the first full month following 
· the close of the donee's taxable year. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(d)(2). See I.R.C. § 
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By allowing future deductions based on income received or accrued 
by the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income 
. stemming from the activity in which the donated property is used,173 the 
new law places a difficult burden on charities to track specific 
intellectual property assets. Each donated patent or copyright may have 
a different legal protection period depending on when each was 
invented or created. Monitoring individual intellectual property assets 
and the extent to which each is generating income is a monumental task. 
Moreover, considering the future tax deductions at stake under the 
new law, donors will incur substantial monitoring costs. Specifically, the 
new law will require donors to expand resources to monitor the donee's 
income-generating activities directly related to a specific donated patent 
or patents. The burden is on the donor to come to an agreement with the 
donee prior to donation to ensure that the donee will cooperate and 
submit all documents relating to the commercialization of the donated 
patents or financial documents to assist the donor in obtaining future 
deductions based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee 
income. . Future costs associated with these monitoring activities may 
outweigh any future tax benefits, due to the slicling-scale nature of the 
future deduction scheme, and discourage donors from giving their 
intellectual property. 
N. PROPOSAL FOR AN ELECTIVE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION REGIME 
Concern over intellectual property valuation abuses is not adequate 
justification for a complete paradigm shift from a. charitable deduction 
system that provides certain and immediate economic incentives to one 
that provides only ~certain future financial incentives. To prevent the 
foreseeable loss of dissenrination of intellectual property for the 
7701(a)(23) for the defuution of "taxable year." The information required to be provided on 
fue return includes: (1) the name, address, taxable year, and identification number of th~ 
donee; (2) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor; (3) a 
description of the qualified intellectual property; (4) the date of the contribution; (5) the 
amount of net income of the donee for the taxable year that is properly allocable to the 
qualified intellectual property; and (6) such other information as may be specified by the 
form or its instructions. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6p50L-2T(b)(1)-(6). The donee must provide 
a copy of the information return to the donor of the property on or before the date the 
donee is required to file the return with the IRS. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(c)(1) . 
. The IRS issued (and asked for public comment on) new Form 8899, on which 
charitable donees will report qualified donee income. See Comment Request for Form 8899, 
70 Fed. Reg. 37006 Oune 27, 2005). The donee must provide a copy ·of the information 
return to the donor. I.R.C. § 6050L(c) (1984), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882(c)(l), 
(2004). . 
m I.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (amended by 2004 Act). 
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maximum social good, it is critical that the ?overrunent repeal the 1969 
Act (which targeted copyright donations)17 ami the 2004 Act (which 
targeted all other intellectual property donations)175 and adopt a fair 
market value deduction for all intellectual property contributions. A fair 
. market value approach would necessarily require the imposition of strict 
statutory and administrative safeguards to minimize the potential for 
valuation conflicts but not discourage valuable intellectual property . 
donationS. Most importantly, the government should formalize and 
articulate a standard approach to determine the fair market value of 
different types of intellectual property for charitable deduction purposes. 
With respect to donations of artistic works, · the government has 
created a system for obtaining fair, objective valuations. For example, 
the IRS has set up an Art Advisory Panel.176 Composed of twenty-five 
persons, ni.cluding nationally prominent art dealers, museum curators, 
and auction house experts, the Panel reviews an<i evaluates the 
acceptability of art appraisals for income tax purposes. 177 The Art 
Advisory· Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a 
claimed value of $20,000 or more. 178 The recommendation of value by the 
Panel thereby becomes the IRS's position as to valuation.179 The IRS has 
also implemented a valuation safeguard procedure whereby a taxpayer 
can request a //Statement of Review" for a work of art that has been 
. appraised at $50,000 or more. 180 Although significant guidelines exist for 
valuing works of art, few guidelines exist for valuing intellectual 
property intangible assets such as copyrights and patents.181 The · 
m For a summary of the 1969 Act, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
175 For a summary of the 2004 Act, see supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. 
176 Arule-Marie Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection of Art and Tax, 26 COLuM. 
J.L. & ARTS 179, 197 (2003) (describing the panel}. 
177 The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a 
claimed value of $20.,000 or more. Rhodes, supra note 176, at 197. The Art Advisory.Panel 
works in· closed meetings so as to protect taxpayer privacy and ensure objectivity and 
reviews works in alphabetical order by artist so as to minimize recognition of a taxpayer's 
collection. Id. 
1n See id. 
. 
179 The Panel recommendation is reviewed by the Appraisal Service Office and then 
sent to the IRS. In 2003, the Panel reviewed 637 works of art with an aggregate claimed 
valuation over $200 million. The panel recommended adjustments on 51% of the reviewed 
appraisals (total adjustments equaled $68 million). ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE CO:MM'R 
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT FOR 2003 (2003). 
180 Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627. The statement can be requested after the donation 
but before the filing of the tax return reporting the transfer and must be submitted with a 
qualified appraisal and appropriate user fee. Id. 
· 
181 See Parkwood Corp. v .. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1950). For IRS guidelines on 
valuing intangibles, see Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 
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government would necessarily have to formulate valuation guidelines to 
back up the fair market value approach.182 Such guidelines could, for 
example, require appraisers of donated patents to take into 
consideration, and document, the existence of related inventions or 
"prior art," which can decrease a patent's value.183 
To enforce proper valuations and to' prevent fraudulent or collusive 
behavior, the government should require increased accountability on the 
part of charitable donees. The government's approach, historically, has 
been to place accountability on individual and small corporate donors. 
Prior to the enactment of the 2004 Act, if an individual or small corporate 
donor claimed a charitable deduction in excess of $5000, the donor was 
required to obtain a "qualified appraisal" for the property contributed/84 
obtain and attach a fully completed "appraisal summary" to the tax 
return on which the deduction was first claimed (which described the 
fair market value of the property on the date of contribution)/85 and 
maintain the records prescribed by the regulations.186 Further, if the IRS 
identified a situation in which a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable 
deduction, the taxpayer and appraiser could be subject to penalties,187 
while the charity could escape government penalty. Whlle it is true that 
a charitable donee must sign and date an appraisal summary, such an act 
merely acknowledges receipt of the donated property and does not 
indicate that the charity agrees. with the amount claimed as a deduction 
by the donor.188 Legislative reform is needed to ensure that both the 
donor and charitable donee are responsible for accurate valuation.189 The 
(providing methods of valuing intangibles of a business); see also Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 
C.B. 327 (discussing allocation of basis on purchase of lithograph and copyrights thereto). 
182 See, e.g., Drennan, supra ·note 144, at 1093-1106 {recommending special 
considerations when valuing patent, and describing possible modifications to current 
valuationrules). · 
183 See Patent Sting, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 6; see also Michael S. Fuller, The 
Create Act Will Undo the Federal Circuit's Construction of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in Oddzon, and Help 
Promote Research Collaborations, 5 Crn.-KENT J.INTELL. PRoP. 106, 106 {2000) (citing DONALD 
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, Scope (2005) (stating prior arts are "documentary sources 
(patents and publications from anywhere in the world) and non-documentary sources 
{things known, used, or invented in the United States")). 
1114 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(l), (c)(2){i){A) (1996). For the definition of "qualified 
appraisal," see Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13(c){3). 
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13{c)(l), (c){2)(i)(B). For the definition of "appraisal summary," 
see Treas. Reg. §.1.170A-13(c){4). · · 
186 Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13{c)(2)(i){C). 
187 See I.R.C. § 6662 {donor penalty provision) (2006); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 {appraiser 
penalty provisions). 
· 
188 Treas. Reg.§ 1.170A-13(c)(4). 
189 Although charitable donees should have increased accountability, the government 
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government provides tax exempt status to charitable organizations. 
What the government giveth, the government can taketh away in cases 
of valuation abuses. 
A fair market value standard for charitable deduction purposes is 
based on what the market dictates in an arm's-length transaction.190 To 
encourage in-kind philanthropic giving of intellectual property as 
opposed to sales or licenses of intellectual property in the private market,· 
a fair market value standard could utilize valuation premiums.191 
Valuation premiums would provide donors with additional economic 
incentives, recognizing that intellectual property is very important to the 
development and growth of the economy and society; that donating 
intellectual property rights to charitable organizations is significantly 
valuable for future research, investigation, education, and publication 
purposes; and that giving up intellectual property rights prematurely 
should also continue to impose restraints on donors, but apply such restraints equitably to 
all donors of intellectual property. As discussed above, the restraints historically imposed 
on donors (e.g., the requirement to obtain qualified appraisal and attach an appraisal 
summary) were imposed only on individuals and small corporations. See supra notes 184­
86 and. accompanying text. Any restraints to minimize valuation conflicts should be 
imposed on corporate donors as well. 
190 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
191 Premiums for interests in property are not uncommon in determining fair ni.arket 
value under a willing-buyer, willing-seller standard. For example, a "control premium" for 
estate and gift valuation is common in valuing controlling interests in a business entity. 
That means·a willing buyer will often pay a greater amount for a controlling interest in a 
business entity than for its proportional value because it provides the buyer unfettered 
control over business affairs. RICHARD B .. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL EsTATE & GIFT 
TAXATION 'II 10.02[2][c], 10-57 (7thed. 1997). For example, 
[W]hen the subject property is an 80% interest in a closely held business, a 
· willing buyer might pay more than 80% of the total fair market value of the 
business. The willing buyer will pay extra to guarantee unfettered control over 
the business ...With an 80% interest, the willing buyer would control the electic;m 
of officers, the timing and amount of distributions including liquidation, all votes 
of the owners, hiring and salary decisions, and all other aspectS of the business. 
Id. 'II 4.02[4][B], 4-33 (citing Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 658-59 
{1990)). 
Likewise, a "swing vote premium" for estate and gift valuation may be appropriate 
in valuing a minority interest (e.g., 2% interest) of stock of a closely-held business under the 
· presumption tlutt a willing buyer might be willing to pay a premium above the price that 
would normally be paid for a minority interest if the owner of the minority interest would 
have the opportunity to have a significant part in management and distributions. Id. 'li 
4.02[4][B], 4-36. . 
Unlike these control and swing vote premiums, which are designed to determine 
what a willing buyer should pay a willing seller in an arm's length transaction, the 
valuation premiums recommended here would encourage the donations of intellectual 
property with modest market value.· 
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through philanthropy is more profound than the donation of tangible 
property. Tangible, physical property can be quickly destroyed or 
damaged whereas rights to intellectual property cannot.192 A patent or a 
copyright is the confluence of limited monopolistic rights recognized in 
the Constitution for a certain duration of time and scope as decided by 
Congress.193 Patents and copyrights are the foundations that give rise to 
copies of the physical embodiments of the invention, reflications of 
methods, or reproductions of creative works of authorship.1 Giving up 
. a patent or a copyright relinquishes the monopolistic rights recognized 
under the Constitution. Hence, donors could receive a deduction equal 
to fair market value, but with an added premium, for their intellectual 
property donations. Moreover, when a potential donor is contemplating 
a donation of its intellectual property that is of little commercial use or 
value to the donor, the fair market price for such intellectual property at 
. the time of donation is most likely modest. However, such intellectual 
property may be important to a potential donee and its researchers due 
to the unquantifiable knowledge value of the ·intellectual property.­
Valuation premiums, which equate that knowledge value, could serve as 
192 Further, when the copyrighted or patented object is destroyed, the firm can use the 
copyright or patent to create more copies of the physical objects embodying the intellectual 
property. The firm's rights, however, are not absolute, as clearly dictated in the 
Constitution and the relevant federal statutes and regulations. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 335, 336-37 (considering 
intellectual property rights as form of government regulation as evidenced by. federal 
statutes and "the maze of technical rules promulgated under them .... The range of 
government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as in regulation of, 
say, retail electricity or telephone service."). 
'" See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 
1031, 1031 (2005) (stating that intellectual property rights are granted under federal law 
only when inventors and authors have met statutory requirements and rights are limited in 
time and scope). 
1~ Fo~ example, the copyright owner has the exclusive reproduction right without 
limitation to the quantity of the copie.S. See 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006) ("[T]he. owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize [individuals] to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."). Any copies made without 
the authorization of the copyright owner infringe the exclusive right. The copyright statute 
defines "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed," where "fixed" means 
embodied for "a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). In the 
software context, a copy is made when the user downloads the copyrighted software, 
which then functions in the service of the computer or its user so that the copying is no 
longer of a transitory nature. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,260 
(5th Cir. 1988). With the arrival of the Internet, copies of copyrighted content "[have] 
move[d] from an unwieldy, fixed, tangible form to easily manipulated, flexible digital 
formats." Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of 
Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content and 
Destructive Technologies, ~3 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 170 (2005). 
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the enhancement that encourages the donor to give up its monopolistic 
legal rights in the intellectual progerty, despite losing the positive signals 
these assets send about the fum. 1 
Although not advocated here, the government could choose to apply· 
different premiums depending on the type of intellectual property 
donated and the type of charitable recipient. The government might 
choose, for instance, to apply ahigher premium to gifts of patents as 
opposed to copyrights, add a higher premium to gifts of art held by 
collectors or investors as opposed to creators, or apply a higher premium 
to gifts to public charities as opposed to private foundations. With a fair 
. market value standard that incorporates appropriate premiums, the 
government could incentivize social giving and, at the same time, 
maintain . some of the distinctions that it recognized prior to the 
enactment of the. 2004 Act.196 
As an alternative to a system that solely provides current incentives, a 
charitable deduction system could give donors a choice: allow them to 
elect to take a single fair market value deduction in the year of 
contribution or, instead, take future deductions based on income. 
Congress has a history of enacting economic stimulus provisions that 
allow taxpayers to elect to enjoy early the amount of their otherwise 
allowed deductions to encourage desired behavior. For example, the 
government has developed an elaborate cost-recovery system, under 
which taxpayers deduct the cost of acquiring various assets over 
prescribed recovery periods through applicable depreciation and 
amortization allowances.197 The goal behind permitting taxpayers to take 
depreciation or amortization deductions over time is to achieve a fair 
allocation of the costs of acquiring an asset to the period in which the 
195 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
196 As noted above, the 1969 Act created a distinction between patents and copyrights. 
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. It maintained a fair market value deduction 
for donations of patents, but eliminated the fair market value deduction for donations of 
self-created copyrights. Id. The 1969 Act also created a distinction between copyright 
creators and collectors. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 
555. In contrast to copyright creators (who could receive little or no charitable deduction 
for gifts of their creations), investors who purchased· copyrights or received copyrights 
from decedents and who did not hold the copyrights primarily for sale in the ordinary 
course of trade or business remained eligible for a full fair market value deduction. Id. 
197 See, e.g.~ LR.C. § 167 (2005) (authorizing cost recovery deductions, such as 
depreciation and amortization allowances; for certain types of 'property); id. § 168 
(prescribing depredation methods and applicable recovery periods for depreciable tangible 
property); id. § 197 (providing ratable, 15-year amortization method for "section 197 · 
intangibles"). 
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taxpayer realizes income from the assee 98 The government has been 
willing to give up this tax policy goal of clear reflection of income by 
creating accelerated methods of cost recovery to incentivize taxpayer 
behavior for maximum social good. For example, to encourage 
acqUisitions of certain tangible property for certain utilizations that 
would stimulate the economy, the government has ·authorized more 
rapid cost recovery by permitting taxpayers to elect larger deduction 
allowances in early years and smaller deduction allowances in the later 
years of, an asset's statutory recovery period.199 To provide even greater; 
immediate financial incentives to taxpayers who engage in certain 
acquisitive transactions, the government has enacted provisions allowing 
taxpayers to elect to immediately expense 100% of the acquisition costs, 
rather than to capitalize and deduct those costs over time.200 Consistent 
with its historical approach of incentivizing · desired behavior, the 
government could allow donors to elect to take an immediate tax 
deduction for their donations in lieu of taking future tax deductions 
based on income generated by the donated intellectual property.201 
198 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose of 
cost recovery system). 
199 The default "applicable depreciation method" for most tangible property is the 200% 
declining balance method (which permits more rapid cost recovery than, for.example, the 
straight-line method). I.R.C. § 168(b)(l). Section 168(k), enacted in 2002, allows a 
purchaser of "qualified property" to take an additional cost recovery deduction equal to 
30% of the property's cost in the first year (commonly known as "additional first year 
depreciation"). Id. § 168(k)(l). In 2003, section 168(k) was amended to allow a taxpayer to 
elect to increase the amount of the additional first-year cost recovery deduction under 
· section 168{k)(l) to 50% of the cost of "qualified property" (commonly known as "50% 
bonus depreciation"). Id. § 168(k)(4). As a result of these itrimediate financial incentives, a 
taxpayer who purchases qualified . property, otherwise recoverable over long statutory 
recovery periods, could elect to immediately deduct 50% of the cost in the first year and 
deduct the unrecovered remaining 50% over time through the applicable depreciation 
method. 
200 Section 179 of the Code, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to deduct currently 
the cost of acquiring certain depreciable business assets (e.g .., computers, equipment, and 
off-the-shelf software) rather than deduct those costs over statutorily prescribed recovery 
periods. Id. § 179(a) (2004). The maximum allowable deduction for all qualifying property 
placed in service is $100,000 {for taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2008). I.R.C. · 
§ 179(b) (as amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004). The $100,000 amount is 
reduced dollar-for-dollar (but not :below zero) by the amount by which the. cost of 
qualifying property placed in service during the tax year exceeds $400,000 in the case of 
taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2008. Id. 
201 
. The examples provided above deal with tangible property acquisitions. Another 
example relates to research and development. Section 174 allows taxpayer to elect either 
(1) to deduct research and development costs ih the year paid or incurred or (2) to defer 
and amortize ratably such costs over five years. I.R.C. § 174(a)-(b) (1989). 
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By providing an election, the proposal implicitly recognizes that 
donors, especially the new breed of donors today, are sophisticated and 
results-oriented. Today's donors want maximum social impact in return 
for what they d~nate.202 The donors want to be in control of their 
decisions and have choices, such as to elect to take a large deduction in 
the year of contribution or take future, post-contribution deductions 
based on income in subsequent years. The donor is the party with the 
intimate knowledge about the value of the intellectual property that it 
. wants to donate. · The proposed election regime would allow the donor 
· to decide whether to incur the risks and monitoring costs associated with 
the future deduction option based on the value of the intellectual 
property to the donee or to incur the appraisal costs and overvaluation 
risks associated with the certain current deduction option. While the 
election regime would provide an option to donors that give applied 
research to· commercially-driven donees, it would create a necessary, 
economic incentive to donors that give basic, purely scientific research to 
noncommercially.,.driven donees. 
CONCLUSION 
The intersection between intellectual property and taxation meets at 
the act of giving by the firm. Giving intellectual property must be 
encouraged for the benefit of the firm as the donor, the charitable 
organization as the donee, and society as the ultimate benefactor. As 
economists have advocated, the best way to encourage giving is not by 
relying solely on moral or social incentives, but by providing strong, 
economic incentives as well.203 . 
· 
102 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (describing new breed of donors). 
203 See generally STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONO:MICS:. A ROGUE 
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 19-23 (2005) (discussing three basic 
flavors of incentive- economic, social, and moral- and noting that "[v]ery often a single 
incentive scheme will include all three varieties"; also noting problems with substituting 
one incentive for another, which "can produce drastic and often unforeseen results"). 
